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IMF lessons from the financial crisis - admin - 04-03-2013


A torturer of many a graduate student (the famous 'Blanchard and Fisher' textbook), now chief economist of the IMF:



Olivier Blanchard’s Five Lessons for Economists From the Financial Crisis



What did the worst financial crisis and deepest recession in 75 years teach academic economists and policymakers on whose watch it happened? At a recent London School of Economics forum, convened to honor Bank of England Governor Mervyn King, Olivier Blanchard offered some answers.





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Olivier Blanchard


Mr. Blanchard, 64 years old, is well positioned to offer such reconsideration. An internationally prominent macroeconomist, he spent 25 years on the MIT faculty before becoming chief economist at the International Monetary Fund in September 2008, just before the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

Here are Mr. Blanchard¹s five lessons in his own words, lightly edited by The Wall Street Journal’s David Wessel:

#1: Humility is in order.

The Great Moderation [the economically tranquil period from 1987 to 2007] convinced too many of us that the large-economy crisis -­ a financial crisis, a banking crisis ­- was a thing of the past. It wasn’t going to happen again, except maybe in emerging markets. History was marching on.

My generation, which was born after World War II, lived with the notion that the world was getting to be a better and better place. We knew how to do things better, not only in economics but in other fields as well. What we have learned is that¹s not true. History repeats itself. We should have known.

#2: The financial system matters — a lot.

It’s not the first time that we¹re confronted with [former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld called “unknown unknowns,” things that happened that we hadn’t thought about. There is another example in macro-economics:

The oil shocks of the 1970s during which we were students and we hadn’t thought about it. It took a few years, more than a few years, for economists to understand what was going on. After a few years, we concluded that we could think of the oil shock as yet another macroeconomic shock. We did not need to understand the plumbing. We didn’t need to understand the details of the oil market. When there’s an increase in the price of energy or materials, we can just integrate it into our macro models -­ the implications of energy prices on inflation and so on.

This is different. What we have learned about the financial system is that the problem is in the plumbing and that we have to understand the plumbing. Before I came to the Fund, I thought of the financial system as a set of arbitrage equations. Basically the Federal Reserve would chose one interest rate, and then the expectations hypothesis would give all the rates everywhere else with premia which might vary, but not very much. It was really easy. I thought of people on Wall Street as basically doing this for me so I didn¹t have to think about it.

What we have learned is that that’s not the case. In the financial system, a myriad of distortions or small shocks build on each other. When there are enough small shocks, enough distortions, things can go very bad. This has fundamental implications for macro-economics. We do macro on the assumption that we can look at aggregates in some way and then just have them interact in simple models. I still think that¹s the way to go, but this shows the limits of that approach. When it comes to the financial system, it¹s very clear that the details of the plumbing matter.

#3 Interconnectedness matters.

This crisis started in the U.S. and across the ocean in a matter of days and weeks. Each crisis, even in small islands, potentially has effects on the rest of the world. The complexity of the cross border claims by creditors and by debtors clearly is something that many of us had not fully realized: the cross border movements triggered by the risk-on/risk-off movements, which countries are safe havens, and when and why? Understanding this has become absolutely essential. What happens in the part of the world cannot be ignored by the rest of the world. The fact that we all spend so much time thinking about Cyprus in the last few days is an example of that.

It’s also true in trade side. We used to think if one country was doing badly, then exports to that country would do badly and therefore the exporting countries would do badly. In our models, the effect was relatively small. One absolutely striking fact of the crisis is the collapse of trade in 2009. Output went down. Trade collapsed. Countries which felt they were not terribly exposed through trade turned out to be enormously exposed.

#4 We don’t know if macro-prudential tools work.

It’s very clear that the traditional monetary and fiscal tools are just not good enough to deal with the very specific problems in the financial system. This has led to the development of macro-prudential tools, which what may or may not become the third leg of macroeconomic policies.

[Macroprudential tools allow a central bank to restrain lending in specific sectors without raising interest rates for the whole economy, such as increasing the minimum down payment required to get a mortgage, which reduces the loan-to-value ratio.] In principle, they can address specific issues in the financial sector. If there is a problem somewhere you can target the tool at the problem and not use the policy interest rate, which basically is kind of an atomic bomb without any precision.

The big question here is: How reliable are these tools? How much can they be used? The answer — from some experiments before the crisis with loan-to-value ratios and during crisis with variations in cyclical bank capital ratios or loan-to-value ratios or capital controls, such as in Brazil — is this: They work but they don’t work great. People and institutions find ways around them. In the process of reducing the problem somewhere you tend to create distortions elsewhere.

#5 Central bank independence wasn’t designed for what central banks are now asked to do.

There is two-way interaction between monetary policy and macro prudential tools. When Ben Bernanke does expansionary monetary policy, quantitative easing, and interest rates on many assets are close to zero, there’s a tendency by many players to take risks to increase their rate of return Some of this risk actually we want them to take. Some we don¹t want them to take. That is the interaction of monetary policy on the financial system.

You also have it the other way around. If you use macro prudential tools to, say, slow down the building in the housing sector but you have an effect on aggregate demand, which is going to decrease output.

The question is: How do you organize the use of these tools? It makes sense to have them under the same roof. In practice means the central bank. But that poses questions not only about coordination between the two functions, but also about central bank independence.

One of the major achievements of the last 20 years is that most central banks have become independent of elected governments. Independence was given because the mandate and the tools were very clear. The mandate was primarily inflation, which can be observed over time. The tool was some short-term interest rate that could be used by the central bank to try to achieve the inflation target. In this case, you can give some independence to the institution in charge of this because the objective is perfectly well defined, and everybody can basically observe how well the central bank does..

If you think now of central banks as having a much larger set of responsibilities and a much larger set of tools, then the issue of central bank independence becomes much more difficult. Do you actually want to give the central bank the independence to choose loan-to-value ratios without any supervision from the political process. Isn’t this going to lead to a democratic deficit in a way in which the central bank becomes too powerful? I¹m sure there are ways out. Perhaps there could be independence with respect to some dimensions of monetary policy -­ the traditional ones — and some supervision for the rest or some interaction with a political process.




RE: IMF lessons from the financial crisis - admin - 04-03-2013

With all respect to Oliver Blanchard, but I think there are more lessons to be drawn here,especially the need for proper regulation of financial markets:

  1. Financial markets are extremely prone to information asymmetries, that is, one party in a transaction knowing significantly more than the other party, and opportunistically exploiting this advantage
  2. Once you realize the staggering amounts of information behind simple prices like those for stocks, bonds, or other financial products, you'll begin to understand that problem.
  3. Disclosure and transparency, and the importance of reputation are ways to deal with this problem to some extent, forced by regulation
  4. If you disagree, I have a simple question. Do you prefer to trade stocks on the Pink Sheets, or on the NYSE?
  5. Simple rules could have prevented exceses, like rules on maximum leverage at banks and investment banks, rules for mortgages (downpayments, tying the size to income, etc.)
  6. Securization is a mixed blessing, the market isn't always better. It is the job of banks to assess and monitor credit risk, but by repackaging low quality mortgages into complex marketable securities, they lost the incenitve to execute this primary task. Instead, they opportunistically exploited information asymmetries (that is, they knew most of these mortgages were junk, but by repackaging them into complex products, they managed to convince buyers that they weren't).



RE: IMF lessons from the financial crisis - admin - 05-01-2013

Blanchard at it again:

Posted on April 29, 2013 by iMFdirect

By Olivier Blanchard

The IMF has just hosted a second conference devoted to rethinking macroeconomic policy in the wake of the crisis. After two days of fascinating presentations and discussions, I am certain of one thing:  this is unlikely to be our last conference on the subject.

Rethinking and reforms are both taking place.  But we still do not know the final destination, be it for the redefinition of monetary policy, or the contours of financial regulation, or the role of macroprudential tools. We have a general sense of direction, but we are largely navigating by sight.

I shall take six examples, inspired by the conference.  More thoughts are given in this recent paper .

1. Navigating by sight.  Financial regulation.

There is no agreed vision of what the future financial architecture should look like, and by implication, no agreed vision of what the appropriate financial regulation should be. You may remember the famous quote by Paul Volcker that the only useful financial innovation of the last 40 years has been the ATM machine.  This is surely an exaggeration. But we are still unsure about the right role of securitization, the right scope for derivatives, the role of markets versus banks, and the role of shadow banking versus banking.

Still, we all agree that some things should change, and indeed policymakers are putting in place measures in the context of international or national initiatives.  One example is the increase in required capital ratios. It may not be a panacea, but it surely can make the financial system more robust. Even so, however, I am struck by the level of uncertainty and disagreement about the effects of capital ratios on funding costs, and thus on lending. Reasonable people, such as Martin Hellwig and Anat Admati, argue that we are not so far from the Modigliani-Miller world, and banks can afford substantially higher capital ratios.  Others, and not only bankers, argue that such ratios would instead destroy the banking industry.

Another example is capital flows, and by implication, the role of capital controls. I was struck by Helene Rey’s presentation , where she showed how surprisingly meager the hard econometric evidence is on the benefits of portfolio flows. I was also struck by Stanley Fischer’s rhetorical question: what is the usefulness of short term capital inflows? Clearly, how we think of the scope for capital controls depends very much on the answer to these basic questions.

2. Navigating by sight.  The role of the financial sector.

It has become cliché to say that macroeconomic thinking understated the role of financial factors in economic fluctuations.  Much analytical work has taken place over the past five years to reintroduce the financial system in our models. But we are not there yet. For example, is there a credit and financial cycle, separate from the business cycle, as Claudio Borio suggests?   Or should we think of financial shocks as another source of disturbance, and the financial system as just another source of amplification?

Was Stephan Gerlach right when he asked whether we should really reconsider all of macroeconomics for an event that may happen once every hundred years?  Or, instead, are financial shocks and the financial system so central to macroeconomic fluctuations that the IS-LM  model—which, as you will recall, does not include an explicit financial system—is not an acceptable port of entry into macroeconomics?

By implication, there is no agreement on how or even whether to integrate financial stability and macro stability in the mandate of central banks. Does it require a tweak to inflation targeting, or much more radical rethinking?  The intellectually pleasant position is to argue that macroprudential tools will take care of financial stability, so monetary policy can still focus on its usual business—  inflation targeting. I read, perhaps unfairly, Michael Woodford’s discussion at this conference to suggest that the crisis should lead us to shift from inflation targeting to nominal income targeting, without a major emphasis on financial stability. I am skeptical that this is the right answer. I think we have to be realistic about the role that macroprudential tools can play, and that monetary policy cannot ignore financial stability. This brings me to my third point.

3. Navigating by sight.  Macroprudential tools.

At our first Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy conference in 2011 , macroprudential tools were, to use Andrew Haldane’s phrase, very much the new kid on the block.  It was clear that the two standard tools, fiscal and monetary policy, were not the right ones to deal with financial imbalances and risks. The question then was:  is macroprudential policy going to be the third leg of macroeconomic policy, or just a crutch to help the first two?

We do not have the answer yet.  But as more and more countries are using those tools, we are learning. I draw two lessons from the evidence, and from the presentations today.

First, these tools work, but their effects are still hard to calibrate, and when used, they seem to have moderated rather than stopped unhealthy booms. This is also my reading from Governor Kim’s presentation.

Second, by their nature, they affect specific sectors and specific groups, and raise political economy issues. This was clear from Stanley Fischer’s presentation on the use of loan-to-value ratios in Israel.

4. Navigating by sight. Governance and allocation of tasks between microprudential, macroprudential, and monetary policy or, as Avinash Dixit has nicely called them, MIP, MAP, MOP.

How should microprudential and macroprudential regulation be coordinated? It is sometimes said that they are likely to conflict. Conceptually, I do not see why they should:  I see macroprudential as simply taking into account systemic effects and the state of the economy in thinking about bank regulation and the situation of each financial institution.

For example, I see macroprudential regulation requiring higher capital ratios from more systemically important banks, or for higher capital ratios when aggregate credit growth appears too high. The question is how to work out the division of labor and the interactions between the two, so that this indeed is what happens.

If not done right, it might mean that, as a bust starts, the micro prudential supervisor ignores systemic aspects and other events, and asks for higher capital ratios, while the macroprudential supervisor rightly believes the opposite is needed. The United Kingdom’s approach, with the creation of a Financial Stability Committee which can impose capital ratios that vary over time and across sectors, seems like a good way to proceed. You can read more about this in Andrew Haldane’s discussion of the issues.

How macroprudential regulation and monetary policy should be combined raises more complex issues. There is little question that each one affects the other:  monetary policy affects risk taking, and macroprudential tools affect aggregate demand. So policymakers need to coordinate.

Given that monetary policy surely must stay with the central bank, this suggests putting both of them under one roof at the central bank.  But this in turn raises the issue of central bank independence. It is one thing to give the bank independence with respect to the policy rate; it is another to let it set maximum loan-to-value ratios, and debt-to-income ratios.   At some point, the issue of democratic deficit arises.

Maybe the solution is not so hard, namely to give various degrees of independence to the central bank.  Stanley Fischer gave us a marvelous analogy, and pointed us toward the solution, when he said that anybody who is married easily understands the notion of various degrees of independence. Again, the United Kingdom’s approach, with its two parallel committees within the central bank, one focusing on monetary policy, the other on financial policy with a limited set of macroprudential tools, not including for example loan-to-value ratios, seems like a reasonable approach.

5. Navigating by sight.   The sustainable level of debt.

The rate of fiscal consolidation depends, upon other things, on what we think a sustainable level of debt is.  Many countries are going to be managing levels of debt close to 100 percent of GDP for many years to come. There is a standard list of textbook answers as to why high debt is costly, from lower capital accumulation to the need for higher, distortionary taxes.  I suspect the costs are elsewhere. I see two main costs.

The first is debt overhang. The higher the debt, the higher the probability of default, the higher the spread on government bonds, and the harder it is for the government to achieve debt sustainability. But the adverse effects do not stop there. Higher sovereign spreads affect private lending spreads, and in turn affect investment and consumption. Higher uncertainty about debt sustainability, and accordingly about future inflation and future taxation, affects all decisions. I am struck at how limited our understanding is of these channels. Reduced form regressions of growth on debt can take us only so far.

The second related cost is the risk of multiple equilibria. At high levels of debt, there may well be two equilibria, a “good equilibrium’’ at which rates are low and debt is sustainable, and a “bad equilibrium’’ in which rates are high, and, as a result, the interest burden is higher, and, in turn, the probability of default is higher.  When debt is very high, it may not take much of a change of heart by investors to move from the good to the bad equilibrium.

I suspect that this is partly at work behind the Italian and the Spanish bond spreads. In this context, Martin Wolf asked a provocative question:  why are the spreads so much higher for Spain than for the United Kingdom? Debt and deficits are actually slightly lower in Spain than in the United Kingdom. No doubt, the overall economic situation of Spain is worse than in the United Kingdom’s, but does this explain fully the difference in spreads?  Could  the answer lie in the difference in monetary policy? In the case of the United Kingdom, investors expect the Bank of England to intervene if needed to maintain the good equilibrium, whereas they believe the European Central Bank does not have the mandate to do? These are central questions, which we need to study more.

6. Navigating by sight. Multiple equilibria and communication

In a world of multiple equilibria, announcements can matter a lot. Take for example the case of the Outright Monetary Transaction program announced by the European Central Bank. The announcement of the program can be interpreted as having removed one of the sources of multiple equilibria in the sovereign bond markets, namely redenomination risk—the danger that investors, assuming that a periphery country would leave the euro, ask in turn for a large premium, thereby forcing exit from the euro in the process. The announcement has succeeded, without the program actually having to be used.

From this viewpoint, the recent announcement by the Bank of Japan that it intends to double the monetary base is even more interesting. What effect it will have on inflation depends very much on how Japanese households and firms change their inflation expectations. If they revise them up, this will affect their wage and price decisions, and lead to higher inflation—which is the desired outcome in the Japanese deflation context.  But if they do not revise them, there is no reason to think that inflation will increase much.

The motivation for this dramatic monetary expansion is thus largely to give a psychological shock, and shift perceptions and price dynamics. Will it work together with the other measures taken by the Japanese authorities? Let’s hope so.  But we are very far from the mechanical effects of monetary policy described in the textbooks.

I could go on. Indeed, there were many contributions and insights from the conference that I have had to leave out.  The conference has left us with a clear research agenda.  We, at the IMF, fully intend to take up the challenge.




RE: IMF lessons from the financial crisis - admin - 05-04-2013


The Lessons of the North Atlantic Crisis for Economic Theory and Policy


Posted on May 3, 2013 by iMFdirect

Joseph_E._StiglitzGuest post by: Joseph E. Stiglitz
Columbia University, New York, and co-host of the Conference on Rethinking Macro Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons

In analyzing the most recent financial crisis, we can benefit somewhat from the misfortune of recent decades. The approximately 100 crises that have occurred during the last 30 years—as liberalization policies became  dominant—have given us a wealth of experience and mountains of data.  If we look over a 150 year period, we have an even richer data set.

With a century and half of clear, detailed information on crisis after crisis, the burning question is not How did this happen? but How did we ignore that long history, and think that we had solved the problems with the business cycle? Believing that we had made big economic fluctuations a thing of the past took a remarkable amount of hubris.

Markets are not stable, efficient, or self-correcting

The big lesson that  this crisis forcibly brought home—one we should have long known—is that economies are not necessarily efficient, stable or self-correcting.

There are two parts to this belated revelation. One is that standard models had focused on exogenous shocks, and yet it’s very clear that a very large fraction of the perturbations to our economy are endogenous.  There are not only short‑run endogenous shocks; there are long‑run structural transformations and persistent shocks. The models that focused on exogenous shocks simply misled us—the majority of the really big shocks come from within the economy.

Secondly, economies are not self-correcting.  It’s clear that we have yet to fully take on aboard this crucial lesson that we should have learned from this crisis: even in its aftermath, the tepid attempts to fix the economies of the United States and Europe have been a failure.  They certainly have not gone far enough.  The result is that we continue to face significant risks of another crisis in the future.

So too, the responses to the crisis have not brought our economies anywhere near back to full employment.  The loss in GDP between our potential and our actual output is in the trillions of dollars.

Of course, some will say that it could have been done worse, and that’s true. Considering that the people in charge of fixing the crisis included some of  the same ones who created it in the first place, it is perhaps  remarkable it hasn’t been a bigger catastrophe.

More than deleveraging, more than a balance sheet crisis: the need for structural transformation

In terms of human resources, capital stock, and natural resources, we’re roughly  at the same levels today that we were before the crisis.  Meanwhile, many countries have not regained their pre-crisis GDP levels, to say nothing of a return to the pre-crisis  growth paths. In a very fundamental sense, the crisis is still not fully resolved—and there’s no good economic theory that explains why that should be the case.

Some of this has to do with the issue of the slow pace of deleveraging.  But even as the economy deleverages, there is every reason to believe that it will not return to full employment.  We are not likely to return to the pre-crisis household savings rate of zero—nor would it be a good thing if we did.  Even if manufacturing has a slight recovery, most of the jobs that have been lost in that sector will not be regained.

Some have suggested that, looking at past data, we should resign ourselves to this unfortunate state of affairs.  Economies that have had severe financial crises typically recover slowly.  But the fact that things have often gone badly in the aftermath of  a financial crisis doesn’t mean they must go badly.

This is more than just a balance sheet crisis.  There is a deeper cause:  The United States and Europe are going through a  structural transformation.  There is a structural transformation associated with the move from manufacturing to a service sector economy.    Additionally, changing comparative advantages requires massive adjustments in the structure of the North Atlantic countries.

Reforms that are, at best, half-way measures

Markets by themselves do not in general lead to efficient, stable and socially acceptable outcomes.  This means we have to think a little bit more deeply about what kind of economic architectures will lead to growth, real stability, and a good distribution of income.

There is an ongoing debate about  whether we simply need to tweak the existing economic architecture or whether we need to make more fundamental changes.  I have two concerns.  One I hinted at earlier:  the reforms undertaken so far have only tinkered at the edges.  The second is that some of the changes in our economic structure (both before and after the crisis) that were supposed to make the economy perform better may not have done so.

There are some reforms, for instance, that may enable the economy to better withstand small shocks, but actually make it less able to absorb big shocks.  This is true of much of the financial sector integration that may have allowed the economy to absorb some of the smaller shocks, but clearly made the economy less resilient to fatter‑tail shocks.

It should be clear that many of the “improvements” in markets before the crisis actually increased countries’ exposure to risk.  Whatever the benefits that might be derived from capital and financial market liberalization (and they are questionable), there have been severe costs in terms of increased risk.  We ought to be rethinking attitudes towards these reforms—and the IMF should be commended for its rethinking in recent years.  One of the objectives of capital account management, in all of its forms, can be to reduce domestic volatility arising from a country’s international engagements.

More generally, the crisis has brought home the importance of financial regulation for macroeconomic stability.  But as I assess what has happened since the crisis, I feel disappointed.  With the mergers that have occurred in the aftermath of the crisis, the problem of too-big-to- fail banks has become even worse.  But the problem is not just with too-big-to-fail banks.  There are banks that are too intertwined to fail and banks that are too correlated to fail.  We have done little about any of these issues. There has, of course, been a huge amount of discussion about too- big-to-fail. But being too correlated is a distinct issue.  There is a strong need for a more diversified ecology of financial institutions that would reduce incentives to be excessively correlated and lead to greater stability.  This is a perspective that has not been emphasized nearly enough.

Also, we haven’t done enough to increase bank capital requirements.  Missing in much of the discussion is an assessment of the costs vs. benefits of higher capital requirements.  We know the benefits—a lower risk of a government bailout and a recurrence of the kinds of events that marked 2007 and 2008.  But on the cost side, we’ve paid too little attention to the  fundamental  insights of the Modigliani‑Miller Theorem, which explains the bogusness of arguments that increasing capital requirements will increase the cost of capital.

Deficiencies in reforms and in modeling

If we had begun our reform efforts with a focus on how to make our economy more efficient and more stable, there are other questions we would have naturally asked; other questions we would have posed.    Interestingly, there is some correspondence between these deficiencies in our reform efforts and the deficiencies in the models that we as economists often use in macroeconomics.

The importance of credit

We would, for instance, have asked what the fundamental roles of the financial sector are, and how we can get it to perform those roles better.  Clearly, one of the key roles is the allocation of capital and the provision of credit, especially to small and medium-sized enterprises, a function which it did not perform well before the crisis, and which arguably it is still not fulfilling well.

This might seem obvious. But a focus on the provision of credit has neither been at the center of policy discourse nor of the standard macro-models.  We have to shift our focus from money to credit.  In any balance sheet, the two sides are usually going to be very highly correlated.  But that is not always the case, particularly in the context of large economic perturbations.  In these, we ought to be focusing on credit.  I find it remarkable the extent to which there has been an inadequate examination in standard macro models of the nature of the credit mechanism. There is, of course, a large microeconomic literature on banking and credit, but for the most part, the insights of this literature has not been taken on board in standard macro-models.

But failing to manage credit is not the only lacuna in our approach.  There is also a lack of understanding of different kinds of finance.  A major area in the analysis of risk in financial markets is the difference between debt and equity.  And in standard macroeconomics, we have barely given this any attention. My book with Bruce Greenwald, Towards a New Paradigm of Monetary Economics ((Cambridge University Press, 2003) was an attempt to remedy this.

Stability

As I have already noted, in the conventional models (and in the conventional wisdom) market economies were stable.  And so it was perhaps not a surprise that fundamental questions about how to design more stable economic systems were seldom asked.  We have already touched on several aspects of this:  how to design economic systems that are less exposed to risk or that generate less volatility on their own.

One of the necessary reforms, but one not emphasized enough, is the need for more automatic stabilizers and fewer automatic destabilizers—not only in the financial sector, but throughout the economy. For instance, the movement from defined benefit to defined contribution systems may have led to a less stable economy.

Elsewhere, I have explained how risk sharing arrangements (especially if poorly designed) can actually lead to more systemic risk:  the pre-crisis conventional wisdom that diversification essentially eliminates risk is just wrong.  I’ve explored this is some detail in this article, along with this paper and this one.

Distribution

Distribution matters as well—distribution among individuals, between households and firms, among households, and among firms.  Traditionally, macroeconomics focused on certain aggregates, such as the average ratio of leverage to GDP.  But that and other average numbers often don’t give a picture of the vulnerability of the economy.

In the case of the financial crisis, such numbers didn’t give us warning signs. Yet it was the fact that a large number of people at the bottom couldn’t make their debt payments that should have tipped us off that something was wrong.

Across the board, our models need to incorporate a greater understanding of heterogeneity and its implications for economic stability.

Policy Frameworks

Flawed models not only lead to flawed policies, but also to flawed policy frameworks.

Should monetary policy focus just on short term interest rates? 

In monetary policy, there is a tendency to think that the central bank should only intervene in the setting of the short-term interest rate.  They believe “one intervention” is better than many.  Since at least 80 years ago with the work of Ramsey  we know that focusing on a single instrument is not generally the best approach.

The advocates of the “single intervention” approach argue that it is best, because it least distorts the economy.  Of course, the reason we have monetary policy in the first place—the reason why government acts to intervene in the economy—is that we don’t believe that markets on their own will set the right short-term interest rate.  If we did, we would just let free markets determine that interest rate.  The odd thing is that while just about every central banker would agree we should intervene in the determination of that price, not everyone is so convinced that we should strategically intervene in others, even though we know from the general theory of taxation and the general theory of market intervention that intervening in just one price is not optimal.

Once we shift the focus of our analysis to credit, and explicitly introduce risk into the analysis, we become aware that we need to use multiple instruments.  Indeed, in general, we want to use all the instruments at our disposal.  Monetary economists often draw a division between macro-prudential, micro-prudential, and conventional monetary policy instruments.  In our book Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, Bruce Greenwald and I argue that this distinction is artificial. The government needs to draw upon all of these instruments, in a coordinated way.  (I’ll return to this point shortly.)

Of course, we cannot “correct” every market failure. The very large ones, however—the macroeconomic failures—will always require our intervention.  Bruce Greenwald and I have pointed out that markets are never Pareto efficient if information is imperfect, if there are asymmetries of information, or if risk markets are imperfect.  And since these conditions are always satisfied, markets are never Pareto efficient.  Recent research has highlighted the importance of these and other related constraints for macroeconomics—though again, the insights of this important work have yet to be adequately integrated either into mainstream macroeconomic models or into mainstream policy discussions.

Price versus quantitative interventions

These theoretical insights also help us to understand why the old presumption among some economists that price interventions are preferable to quantity interventions is wrong.  There are many circumstances in which quantity interventions lead to better economic performance.

Tinbergen

A policy framework that has become popular in some circles argues that so long as there are as many instruments as there are objectives, the economic system is controllable, and the best way of managing the economy in such circumstances is to have an institution responsible for one target and one instrument.  (In this view, central banks have one instrument—the interest rate—and one objective—inflation.  We have already explained why limiting monetary policy to one instrument is wrong.)

Drawing such a division may have advantages from an agency or bureaucratic perspective, but from the point of view of managing macroeconomic policy—focusing on growth, stability and distribution, in a world of uncertainty—it makes no sense.  There has to be coordination across all the issues and among all the instruments that are at our disposal.  There needs to be close coordination between monetary and fiscal policy.  The natural equilibrium that would arise out of having different people controlling different instruments and focusing on different objectives is, in general, not anywhere near what is optimal in achieving overall societal objectives.  Better coordination—and the use of more instruments—-can, for instance, enhance economic stability.

Take this chance to revolutionize flawed models

It should be clear that we could have done much more to prevent this crisis and to mitigate its effects.   It should be clear too that we can do much more to prevent the next one. Still, through this conference and others like it, we are at least beginning to clearly identify the really big market failures, the big macroeconomic externalities, and the best policy interventions for achieving high growth, greater stability, and a better distribution of income.

To succeed, we must constantly remind ourselves that markets on their own are not going to solve these problems, and neither will a single intervention like short-term interest rates. Those facts have been proven time and again over the last century and a half.

And as daunting as the economic problems we now face are, acknowledging this will allow us to take advantage of the one big opportunity  this period of economic trauma has afforded: namely, the chance to revolutionize our flawed  models, and perhaps even exit from an interminable cycle of crises.




RE: IMF lessons from the financial crisis - admin - 05-05-2013


The Cat in the Tree and Further Observations: Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy


Posted on May 1, 2013 by iMFdirect

akerlofGuest post by George A. Akerlof

University of California, Berkeley

Senior Resident Scholar at the IMF, and co-host of the Conference on Rethinking Macro Policy II: First Steps and Early Lessons

I learned a lot from the conference , and I’m very thankful to all the speakers. Do I have an image of the whole thing?  I don’t know whether my image is going to help anybody at all, but my view is that it’s as if a cat has climbed a huge tree. It’s up there, and oh my God, we have this cat up there. The cat, of course, is this huge crisis.

And everybody at the conference has been commenting about what we should do about this stupid cat and how do we get it down and what do we do. What I find so wonderful about this conference is all the speakers have their own respective image of the cat, and nobody has the same opinion.  But then, occasionally, those opinions mesh. That’s my image of what we have been accomplishing.

I think this debate is very useful because each person’s view of the cat comes from his or her perspective. And each of them is valid. My view of the cat is the poor thing is there in the tree; it’s going to fall; and we don’t know what to do.

So I’m going to give you my own thoughts on the crisis and how well we’ve been doing relative to the cat. My thoughts are a slightly different angle on what everybody else has been saying rather pervasively from different vantage points.

I am going to concentrate on the post-crisis United States, but the analysis also pertains internationally. There is an excellent paper  by Oscar Jorda, Morris Schularick and Alan Taylor. They divided up recessions into financial recessions and normal recessions for 14 advanced countries from 1870 to 2008. They looked at how GDP recovery varied in severity, according to credit outstanding relative to GDP in the preceding boom. And their conjecture was strongly confirmed. Not only are financial recessions deeper and slower in recovery than in normal recessions. They also have slower recovery the greater is the credit to GDP ratio.

That is the history.

How do their findings reflect on the current crisis? Curiously, it depends upon the measurement of credit outstanding. With bank loans to the private sector as the measure of credit, the United States’ recovery is about 1 percent of GDP better than mean recovery for financial recessions. When, in addition, the measure of credit also includes credit granted by the shadow banking system, we are about 4 percent better than the median recovery in financial recessions. The graphs in the paper I just mentioned illustrate this.

BUT.

With the onset of financial derivatives we have no way of knowing how to measure “credit.” If derivatives are used to hedge risk then we would expect derivatives to soften the crash.

For example if the buyer of a credit default swap  goes bankrupt in the event of a default, rather than the seller, then we would expect the credit default swap to soften the crash. On the other hand, if we think that derivatives escalate gambling, then we would expect them to exacerbate the crash. The conventional interpretation of the 2007-2008 crash in the United States says that derivatives enhanced gambling in a different way. In parable, derivatives allowed a daisy chain of escalating valuation of mortgages, as they were made in the Central Valley on the shadiest of bases, but then passed through into derivative packages, which were rated A and higher. This was an environment in which junk did not affect ratings.  So mortgage originators had no incentive to require downpayments or borrower credibility. To a great extent, they didn’t. In their creation and ratings of derivatives the investment houses and the ratings agencies were mining their reputations as fiduciaries.  This additional role of the derivatives suggests that a measure of credit based on loans outstanding, even including the role of the shadow banks, yields a conservative measure of our benchmark for where we should now be.

That view also conforms with the common perceptions from the Fall of 2008. At that time the Great Depression was the benchmark for what would happen without government intervention. From that vantage point, macro policy has not just been good, but truly excellent. Alan Blinder’s fantastic book, After the Music Stopped, says the exact same thing.

Almost every program has been close to what the doctor called for. Those measures include:

  • The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
  • The bailout of AIG
  • The rescue of WaMu, Wachovia and CountryWide by adoption
  • TARP
  • The stress tests run by Treasury and the Fed
  • Declines in interest rates to close to zero
  • The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
  • Bailout of the auto industry
  • International co-operation in the spirit of Group of Twenty Meeting in Pittsburgh where the IMF played a leading role.

There is only one major criticism of the policies put in place. We should have led the public to understand that we should measure success not by the level of the current unemployment rate, but by a benchmark that takes into account the financial vulnerability that had been set in the previous boom. We economists have not done a good job of explaining that our macro-stability policies have been effective. There is, of course, good reason why the public has a hard time listening. They have other things to do than to become macroeconomists and macroeconomic historians.

But just a bit of common sense indicates why the policies have been so successful. If Lehman Brothers had been $1 in the red, and it needed to be only $1 in the black to stay out of bankruptcy court, then the expenditure of only $2, at just the right crisis moment, could have saved us from a Great Depression. That $2 finger in the dyke would have been all that was needed.

The expenditures for the bailout were of course more than $2; they will probably be positive, and run to a few billion dollars.  But they did literally stop a financial meltdown which was in progress. Relative to the tens of trillions of GDP that would have been lost with a repeat of the Great Depression, the savings from the Troubled Asset Relief Program are of the order of magnitude of 1,000 to one.  1,000 to one says that figuratively, it may be fair to call this a finger in the dyke.

The expenditures by both the Bush and the Obama administrations on fiscal stimulus have had less bang-for-the-buck. But almost surely they have been effective. Current estimates of government expenditure multipliers are something like 2. That number also makes intuitive sense. Liquidity-trap estimates of a balanced budget multiplier are approximately 1, both in theory and in estimation; and the tax multiplier is robustly measured as approximately 1. And the government expenditure multipliers will be the sum of the two. So the stimulus bills have almost surely also had significant payoff.

In sum, we economists did very badly in predicting the crisis. But the economic policies post-crisis have been close to what a good sensible economist-doctor would have ordered. Those policies have come directly from the Bush and Obama administrations, and from their appointees. They have also been supported by the Congress.

The lesson for the future is that good economics and common sense have worked well: we have had trial and success. We must keep this in mind with policy going forward.




RE: IMF lessons from the financial crisis - admin - 06-01-2013

More from Blanchard, chief economist of the IMF


Rethinking macroeconomic policy: Getting granular


Olivier Blanchard, Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Paolo Mauro, 31 May 2013

The global economic crisis has kept forcing policymakers and academics to rethink macroeconomic policy. First was the Lehman crisis, which showed how much they had underestimated the dangers posed by the financial system, and the limits of monetary policy. Then it was the euro crisis, which forced them to rethink the workings of currency unions, and fiscal policy. And, throughout, they have had to improvise, from the use of unconventional monetary policies, to the initial fiscal stimulus, to the speed of fiscal consolidation, to the use of macroprudential instruments.

As the evidence begins to be analysed through theory and early empirical analysis, several efforts have been made to take stock of what we have learned thus far, amid events that continue to develop (prominent examples include Bernanke 2011, Perotti 2011, Svensson 2009, Woodford 2012).

Since we first looked at the issues roughly two years ago (Blanchard et al. 2010) policies have been tried, and progress has been made, both theoretical and empirical. Here we sketch an update of the status of the debate (see also Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro 2013; Akerlof 2013; Blanchard 2013; Romer 2013; and Stiglitz 2013), which summarise the takeaways from the ‘Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy II’ conference held at the IMF in April 2013 . This column highlights what we think are the (many) main questions, and (few) early lessons to date, in somewhat greater detail.


Policymaking if the ‘Divine Coincidence’ is no longer with us


Since the crisis began, it has become apparent that it is no longer possible for central banks to focus only on keeping inflation at a desired level and hope that, as a by-product, economic activity will stay close to its potential. The relationship between output and inflation appears to have changed. By nearly all estimates, most advanced economies still suffer from a large output gap – yet, inflation, rather than turning to deflation, has largely stabilised. The crisis has also made it clear that sectoral and financial risks can grow under a seemingly calm macroeconomic surface. The policy rate seems too blunt a tool to keep the macroeconomy on an even keel and simultaneously address other imbalances. Moreover, with the policy rate at the zero lower bound, central banks’ only remaining options are to engage in quantitative or targeted easing of monetary policy.

The tentative implications include the following:

  • Should the relation between inflation and output remain weak beyond the aftermath of the crisis, central banks will have to target activity more explicitly than they are doing today;
  • Given the limited power of monetary policy in the liquidity trap, the issue of how to stay away from the trap, and by implication the issue of the optimal rate of inflation, will not go away;
  • Macroprudential policies can decrease but are unlikely to fully eliminate financial risks. The issue of whether and how to use monetary policy instruments to deal with financial stability will remain.


A role for macroprudential instruments


Macroprudential tools can decrease financial risks. Cyclical capital requirements, leverage ratios, or dynamic provisioning can in principle lead banks to build buffers during booms against losses in bad times. Similarly, limits on loan-to-value ratios or debt-to-income ratios can reduce the incidence of credit booms and decrease the probability of financial distress. And, while these are the instruments that have been used so far, we can probably design other instruments to deal with other aspects of the financial system.

In practice, however, several implementation issues arise. For example:

  • How to make micro prudential regulators take account of systemic risk and the state of the economy?

The solution explored in the UK, where the macroprudential authority will be able to vary the capital ratios to be applied by the microprudential regulators seems promising.

  • How to combine monetary and macroprudential policies, given that both affect risk and economic activity?

With separate agencies, the Nash equilibrium might be one where, for example, the central bank cuts rates too aggressively while the financial authority makes macroprudential regulation too stringent. Having the two agencies under one roof makes sense. Again, the UK solution, which houses both monetary and financial stability committees at the Bank of England, seems like a way forward.


Fiscal policies in an era of high government debt and low economic growth


The crisis has shown that what appeared to be safe levels of government debt were in fact not so safe. Two aspects have been highlighted:

  • First, the realisation of contingent liabilities (in the banking system, but also in public enterprises or guarantees on public-private partnerships) can result in rapid and large increases in government debt;
  • Second, the possibility of self-fulfilling debt crises is real.

The evolution of Spanish and Italian sovereign bond yields can be seen in this light, with the ECB’s commitment to intervene in these markets having reduced the risk of a bad equilibrium. Some other Eurozone members, such as Belgium, have benefited from low rates despite high levels of debt and political challenges. How much of the difference in yields across Eurozone members is explained by fundamentals or by multiple equilibria is an open question. It also leads one to ask whether the perception of countries such as the US or Japan as safe havens might change abruptly.

With government debt in the advanced economies at its highest level in peacetime, there is little doubt that the next decade will be characterised by fiscal adjustment (and perhaps, slow growth). Is there a risk of fiscal dominance? Surely there will be a temptation to lean on central banks to money finance deficits and keep real interest rates very low. In this context, it is essential that monetary policy decisions continue to be the sole purview of the central bank which, in turn, should base its decisions on the way the debt situation and fiscal policy impact inflation, output, and financial stability. The risk of fiscal dominance seems less prominent in the Eurozone, where no single government can force the ECB to change its monetary policy. But it may be more relevant elsewhere, for years to come.

At what rate should public debts be reduced? Much of the debate has focused on fiscal multipliers. The debate is likely to continue, though our reading of the evidence is that multipliers have been larger than in normal times, especially at the start of the crisis (Blanchard and Leigh 2013), with little evidence of confidence effects (Perotti 2011). This said, in practice, cross-country differences in the speed of fiscal adjustment have been largely determined by market conditions. To convince markets of a country’s commitment to fiscal adjustment, medium-term plans can be beneficial. Such plans can be made more robust by explaining upfront how they would respond to shocks, such as declines in economic growth (Ivanova, Martin, and Mauro 2011). Existing automatic stabilisers are useful, but far from optimal. Better design of stabilisers should also be on the agenda – so far it is not.


Conclusions


As a result of policy experimentation in the aftermath of the crisis, the relative roles of monetary policy, macroprudential policy, fiscal policy, and their interactions are still evolving. Looking forward, we can think of two alternative scenarios: a conservative one with a return to flexible inflation targeting and limited use of fiscal and macroprudential policies; and a more ambitious one with expanded monetary policy targets and tools, and a more active role of macroprudential and fiscal policies. We suspect the first is more likely than the second. But it may be not be enough to prevent the next crisis.


References


Akerlof, George A (2013) “The cat in the tree and further observations: Rethinking macroeconomic policy”, VoxEU.org, 9 May.

Bernanke, Ben (2011), “The Effects of the Great Recession on Central Bank Doctrine and Practice”, keynote address at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 56th Economic Conference ‘Long Term Effects of the Great Recession’, Boston, 18–19 October.

Blanchard, Olivier (2013), “Rethinking macroeconomic policy”, VoxEU.org, 9 May.

Blanchard, Olivier, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Paolo Mauro (2013), “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy II: Getting Granular”, IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/03.

Blanchard, Olivier, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Paolo Mauro (2010), “Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 42 (supplement), 199-215.

Blanchard, Olivier and Daniel Leigh (2013), “Fiscal Consolidation: At What Speed?”, VoxEU.org, 3 May.

Borio, Claudio, and Ilhyock Shim (2007), “What Can (Macro-)prudential Policy Do To Support Monetary Policy?”, BIS Working Papers No. 242.

Ivanova, Anna, Paolo Mauro, Edouard Martin (2011), “Chipping away at public debt – Sources of failure and keys to success in fiscal adjustment”, VoxEU.org, 9 November.

Perotti, Roberto (2011), “The ‘Austerity Myth’: Gain Without Pain?”, NBER Working Paper No. 17571.

Romer, David (2013), “Preventing the next catastrophe: Where do we stand?”, VoxEU.org, 9 May.

Stiglitz, Joseph (2013), “The lessons of the North Atlantic crisis for economic theory and policy”, VoxEU.org, 9 May.

Svensson, Lars (2009), “Flexible Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, speech delivered at De Nederlandsche Bank, Amsterdam (September).

Woodford, Michael (2012), “Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound”, Presented at the Jackson Hole Symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape”.