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Arguing fair value with IOC after dissent
#1

I think I recall reading from the prior MIC that XOM has to approve any "new fairer deal" to dissenting shareholders.  In any case I think it is useful to start walking through how this may evolve.  I can get only this far.....

Case 1:

1.  Shareholder dissents according to process.

2.  IOC contacts shareholder with "new fairer deal."

3.  Shareholder accepts the deal.  End of story.

Case 2 (my guess):

1.  Steps 1 & 2 above are the same.

2.  Shareholder rejects the lowball offer from IOC.

3.  IOC and shareholder argue and neither side agrees.

4.  At some point court plugs back in and appoints a third party to listen to both sides and settle the situation.  Presumably the settlement value can go no lower than the new offer by IOC, but maybe is likely to go higher based on shareholder arguments.

So a fundamental question is what guidelines will be followed in establishing fair value?  That is the $64 thousand dollar question.  Here's my thoughts on the approaches and one I really like.

1.  Real Market approach.  This is no good for shareholders, because as I've said before in PNG there is NO MARKET for gas.  XOM is a monopoly.  No one can or will compete with them to buy IOC.  Period.  Even in a high LNG price environment (when Phil was there) XOM was the only deal we could get.  This situation will BEGIN to change ONLY AFTER TOT builds its own plant, but that now is unlikely.  Even then you have only two bidders for IOC - still no market IMHO.  So we've already learned that even though TOT plans to build a plant, they won't bother to compete with XOM to buy IOC.    "It's the monopoly....stupid," as politicians like to speak to each other.  Hopefully the court gets that point.  A "fair deal" is impossible in a monopolistic market.  Hopefully the court gets it.  Phil please strongly emphasize that point.

2.  Hypothetical Market approach.  To deal with the monoply in this case the court would need to force assumptions something like this.  Tell the 3rd party consultants who will establish the value to assume there were mutiple LNG plants with different owners OR alternatively, no LNG plants in PNG.  Then that puts all potential bidders on the same footing, however, small companies are blocked out of the latter case as they aren't going to build an LNG plan (we learned that lesson).  This case can be looked at from both an aggregate approach OR a sum of the parts approach to arrive at the fair value.  I would expect that a global view of LNG and natural gas prices would need to be examined to arrive at some unit value and costs.  This "hypothetical market approach" is what we hope for.  This approach also has to look at current and expected future LNG prices, as well as costs.  This can get really complicated because the costs and price assumptions as well as a minimum ROI have to be used to determine value - like doing a mini FID.  Costs are determined on the development scenario.  The lowest cost is to build on to the existing infrastructure - XOM's PNG LNG.  While this would probably yield a good value, it seems way to complicated with a bazillion assumptions.  A third party has to do it I think.

3.  Equivalent ROI and PVPAT Approach.  I like this concept.  I think it is most equitable and most doable.  HEre's a rough idea as to how it would be done using the companies own numbers.  In fact the court could order the companies to prepare it.  TOT and IOC and OSH are working on FID for the joint project and have several options, one being a stand alone new LNG plant.  They no doubt have run cost, price and economic analyses on all of these stand alone options using different costs and LNG prices.  Each set of assumptions generates its own profitability parameters like PVPAT and ROI, etc.  So ONE fair value for IOC shareholders would be to use the highest price for IOC assets which meets the minimum required profitability hurdles of TOT in a stand alone TOT operated LNG project excluding XOM participation.  Then generate a SECOND case where all players are joined together (XOM, TOT, OSH) which is the most likely outcome and use the highest price for IOC that yields the average of the MINIMUM profitability hurdles of all participants to deliver that scenario.  So now there are TWO different  valuations of IOC based on the minimum economic hurdles at which the companies would invest.  Simply average the two values and you have your new AVERAGE MAXIMUM "fair bid".  It is a maximum bid in the sense that it is derived based on minimum investment hurdles.  This AVERAGE MAXIMUM price for IOC will be fair to XOM because XOM will not be expending the captial required by a TOT stand alone case where unit costs will be much higher.  So by averaging the two numbers, the price XOM will pay for IOC will actually yield a much higher profitabilityu than the minimum XOM hurdles.  But there is one catch at least.  In order to satisfy shareholders the evaluation has to include ALL of IOC gas - 7+ TCF from E/A and 6.4+ TCF from Bobcat, Raptor and Triceratops including the recertification volume for E/A.  This latter point of course will drive the price of IOC ballistically upward as it should.  This is where there will be biggest push back. But somehow the court needs to fairly address the huge upside that XOM is capturing from these assets which have 3rd party volume estimates, not to mention a gigantic undrilled HC rich acerage position and many other assets, which shareholders will never share in by owning XOM shares as they would have owning IOC shares.  IOC mangement and BOD have eggregiously misled and mis represented the future of IOC to shareholders even into 2015 while rewarding themselves at excessive levels unheard of in industry, while they have drained the company and wasted capital and left shareholders completely in the dark as to why resource volumes at E/A have suddenly shrunk after a long run of increasing volumes and ever improving well and reservoir results.  The court would do well to use this approach to settle the gross injustices that shareholders have been subjected to.  What could that value be under this approach?  Multiples higher than the current offer IMHO.

Anyone got any other better approaches?

Reply

#2

'Kaliboo' pid='78918' datel Wrote:

I think I recall reading from the prior MIC that XOM has to approve any "new fairer deal" to dissenting shareholders.  In any case I think it is useful to start walking through how this may evolve.  I can get only this far.....

Case 1:

1.  Shareholder dissents according to process.

2.  IOC contacts shareholder with "new fairer deal."

3.  Shareholder accepts the deal.  End of story.

Case 2 (my guess):

1.  Steps 1 & 2 above are the same.

2.  Shareholder rejects the lowball offer from IOC.

3.  IOC and shareholder argue and neither side agrees.

4.  At some point court plugs back in and appoints a third party to listen to both sides and settle the situation.  Presumably the settlement value can go no lower than the new offer by IOC, but maybe is likely to go higher based on shareholder arguments.

So a fundamental question is what guidelines will be followed in establishing fair value?  That is the $64 thousand dollar question.  Here's my thoughts on the approaches and one I really like.

1.  Real Market approach.  This is no good for shareholders, because as I've said before in PNG there is NO MARKET for gas.  XOM is a monopoly.  No one can or will compete with them to buy IOC.  Period.  Even in a high LNG price environment (when Phil was there) XOM was the only deal we could get.  This situation will BEGIN to change ONLY AFTER TOT builds its own plant, but that now is unlikely.  Even then you have only two bidders for IOC - still no market IMHO.  So we've already learned that even though TOT plans to build a plant, they won't bother to compete with XOM to buy IOC.    "It's the monopoly....stupid," as politicians like to speak to each other.  Hopefully the court gets that point.  A "fair deal" is impossible in a monopolistic market.  Hopefully the court gets it.  Phil please strongly emphasize that point.

2.  Hypothetical Market approach.  To deal with the monoply in this case the court would need to force assumptions something like this.  Tell the 3rd party consultants who will establish the value to assume there were mutiple LNG plants with different owners OR alternatively, no LNG plants in PNG.  Then that puts all potential bidders on the same footing, however, small companies are blocked out of the latter case as they aren't going to build an LNG plan (we learned that lesson).  This case can be looked at from both an aggregate approach OR a sum of the parts approach to arrive at the fair value.  I would expect that a global view of LNG and natural gas prices would need to be examined to arrive at some unit value and costs.  This "hypothetical market approach" is what we hope for.  This approach also has to look at current and expected future LNG prices, as well as costs.  This can get really complicated because the costs and price assumptions as well as a minimum ROI have to be used to determine value - like doing a mini FID.  Costs are determined on the development scenario.  The lowest cost is to build on to the existing infrastructure - XOM's PNG LNG.  While this would probably yield a good value, it seems way to complicated with a bazillion assumptions.  A third party has to do it I think.

3.  Equivalent ROI and PVPAT Approach.  I like this concept.  I think it is most equitable and most doable.  HEre's a rough idea as to how it would be done using the companies own numbers.  In fact the court could order the companies to prepare it.  TOT and IOC and OSH are working on FID for the joint project and have several options, one being a stand alone new LNG plant.  They no doubt have run cost, price and economic analyses on all of these stand alone options using different costs and LNG prices.  Each set of assumptions generates its own profitability parameters like PVPAT and ROI, etc.  So ONE fair value for IOC shareholders would be to use the highest price for IOC assets which meets the minimum required profitability hurdles of TOT in a stand alone TOT operated LNG project excluding XOM participation.  Then generate a SECOND case where all players are joined together (XOM, TOT, OSH) which is the most likely outcome and use the highest price for IOC that yields the average of the MINIMUM profitability hurdles of all participants to deliver that scenario.  So now there are TWO different  valuations of IOC based on the minimum economic hurdles at which the companies would invest.  Simply average the two values and you have your new AVERAGE MAXIMUM "fair bid".  It is a maximum bid in the sense that it is derived based on minimum investment hurdles.  This AVERAGE MAXIMUM price for IOC will be fair to XOM because XOM will not be expending the captial required by a TOT stand alone case where unit costs will be much higher.  So by averaging the two numbers, the price XOM will pay for IOC will actually yield a much higher profitabilityu than the minimum XOM hurdles.  But there is one catch at least.  In order to satisfy shareholders the evaluation has to include ALL of IOC gas - 7+ TCF from E/A and 6.4+ TCF from Bobcat, Raptor and Triceratops including the recertification volume for E/A.  This latter point of course will drive the price of IOC ballistically upward as it should.  This is where there will be biggest push back. But somehow the court needs to fairly address the huge upside that XOM is capturing from these assets which have 3rd party volume estimates, not to mention a gigantic undrilled HC rich acerage position and many other assets, which shareholders will never share in by owning XOM shares as they would have owning IOC shares.  IOC mangement and BOD have eggregiously misled and mis represented the future of IOC to shareholders even into 2015 while rewarding themselves at excessively levels unheard of in industry, while they have drained the company and wasted capital and left shareholders completely in the dark as to why resource volumes at E/A have suddenly shrunk after a long run of increasing volumes and ever improving well and reservoir results.  The court would do will to use this approach to settle the gross injustices that shareholders have been subjected to.  What could that value be under this approach?  Multiples higher than the current offer IMHO.

Anyone got any other better approaches?


In response to your option 1 above:

Actually I think you may be overlooking something... The market for the gas is asia, just as Oil Search, Santos, and ExxonMobil have suggested in their separate releases regarding the Muruk-1 well and the Muruk resource which they have estimated at 2Tcfe and then assisted "The Australian" in valuing at the current spot buy price for LNG in Asia ~ $7/mcf. They have provided the market definition for Papua New Guinea derived gas. We can use this as the market definition and this will be "quite fair" because the major players in the Papua New Guinea gas industry made the definition.

The asian LNG price is rising, as is the asian demand for gas. This model prices InterOil's share of E/A to around ten times the current offer at retail, so there is a lot of fat contained in the XOM margin.
Reply

#3

'thg' pid='78920' dateline='<a href="tel:1483979 Wrote:

'Kaliboo' pid='78918' dateline='<a href="tel:1483977 Wrote:

I think I recall reading from the prior MIC that XOM has to approve any "new fairer deal" to dissenting shareholders.  In any case I think it is useful to start walking through how this may evolve.  I can get only this far.....

Case 1:

1.  Shareholder dissents according to process.

2.  IOC contacts shareholder with "new fairer deal."

3.  Shareholder accepts the deal.  End of story.

Case 2 (my guess):

1.  Steps 1 & 2 above are the same.

2.  Shareholder rejects the lowball offer from IOC.

3.  IOC and shareholder argue and neither side agrees.

4.  At some point court plugs back in and appoints a third party to listen to both sides and settle the situation.  Presumably the settlement value can go no lower than the new offer by IOC, but maybe is likely to go higher based on shareholder arguments.

So a fundamental question is what guidelines will be followed in establishing fair value?  That is the $64 thousand dollar question.  Here's my thoughts on the approaches and one I really like.

1.  Real Market approach.  This is no good for shareholders, because as I've said before in PNG there is NO MARKET for gas.  XOM is a monopoly.  No one can or will compete with them to buy IOC.  Period.  Even in a high LNG price environment (when Phil was there) XOM was the only deal we could get.  This situation will BEGIN to change ONLY AFTER TOT builds its own plant, but that now is unlikely.  Even then you have only two bidders for IOC - still no market IMHO.  So we've already learned that even though TOT plans to build a plant, they won't bother to compete with XOM to buy IOC.    "It's the monopoly....stupid," as politicians like to speak to each other.  Hopefully the court gets that point.  A "fair deal" is impossible in a monopolistic market.  Hopefully the court gets it.  Phil please strongly emphasize that point.

2.  Hypothetical Market approach.  To deal with the monoply in this case the court would need to force assumptions something like this.  Tell the 3rd party consultants who will establish the value to assume there were mutiple LNG plants with different owners OR alternatively, no LNG plants in PNG.  Then that puts all potential bidders on the same footing, however, small companies are blocked out of the latter case as they aren't going to build an LNG plan (we learned that lesson).  This case can be looked at from both an aggregate approach OR a sum of the parts approach to arrive at the fair value.  I would expect that a global view of LNG and natural gas prices would need to be examined to arrive at some unit value and costs.  This "hypothetical market approach" is what we hope for.  This approach also has to look at current and expected future LNG prices, as well as costs.  This can get really complicated because the costs and price assumptions as well as a minimum ROI have to be used to determine value - like doing a mini FID.  Costs are determined on the development scenario.  The lowest cost is to build on to the existing infrastructure - XOM's PNG LNG.  While this would probably yield a good value, it seems way to complicated with a bazillion assumptions.  A third party has to do it I think.

3.  Equivalent ROI and PVPAT Approach.  I like this concept.  I think it is most equitable and most doable.  HEre's a rough idea as to how it would be done using the companies own numbers.  In fact the court could order the companies to prepare it.  TOT and IOC and OSH are working on FID for the joint project and have several options, one being a stand alone new LNG plant.  They no doubt have run cost, price and economic analyses on all of these stand alone options using different costs and LNG prices.  Each set of assumptions generates its own profitability parameters like PVPAT and ROI, etc.  So ONE fair value for IOC shareholders would be to use the highest price for IOC assets which meets the minimum required profitability hurdles of TOT in a stand alone TOT operated LNG project excluding XOM participation.  Then generate a SECOND case where all players are joined together (XOM, TOT, OSH) which is the most likely outcome and use the highest price for IOC that yields the average of the MINIMUM profitability hurdles of all participants to deliver that scenario.  So now there are TWO different  valuations of IOC based on the minimum economic hurdles at which the companies would invest.  Simply average the two values and you have your new AVERAGE MAXIMUM "fair bid".  It is a maximum bid in the sense that it is derived based on minimum investment hurdles.  This AVERAGE MAXIMUM price for IOC will be fair to XOM because XOM will not be expending the captial required by a TOT stand alone case where unit costs will be much higher.  So by averaging the two numbers, the price XOM will pay for IOC will actually yield a much higher profitabilityu than the minimum XOM hurdles.  But there is one catch at least.  In order to satisfy shareholders the evaluation has to include ALL of IOC gas - 7+ TCF from E/A and 6.4+ TCF from Bobcat, Raptor and Triceratops including the recertification volume for E/A.  This latter point of course will drive the price of IOC ballistically upward as it should.  This is where there will be biggest push back. But somehow the court needs to fairly address the huge upside that XOM is capturing from these assets which have 3rd party volume estimates, not to mention a gigantic undrilled HC rich acerage position and many other assets, which shareholders will never share in by owning XOM shares as they would have owning IOC shares.  IOC mangement and BOD have eggregiously misled and mis represented the future of IOC to shareholders even into 2015 while rewarding themselves at excessively levels unheard of in industry, while they have drained the company and wasted capital and left shareholders completely in the dark as to why resource volumes at E/A have suddenly shrunk after a long run of increasing volumes and ever improving well and reservoir results.  The court would do will to use this approach to settle the gross injustices that shareholders have been subjected to.  What could that value be under this approach?  Multiples higher than the current offer IMHO.

Anyone got any other better approaches?


In response to your option 1 above:

Actually I think you may be overlooking something... The market for the gas is asia, just as Oil Search, Santos, and ExxonMobil have suggested in their separate releases regarding the Muruk-1 well and the Muruk resource which they have estimated at 2Tcfe and then assisted "The Australian" in valuing at the current spot buy price for LNG in Asia ~ $7/mcf. They have provided the market definition for Papua New Guinea derived gas. We can use this as the market definition and this will be "quite fair" because the major players in the Papua New Guinea gas industry made the definition.

The asian LNG price is rising, as is the asian demand for gas. This model prices InterOil's share of E/A to around ten times the current offer at retail, so there is a lot of fat contained in the XOM margin.

I disagree.  The market for the LNG is Asia and the world.  The market for the gas is PNG.  IOC does not have LNG to sell.  That's where the term "stranded gas" comes from.  You have to be able to get it to the market to sell it or there is no market.  Hence until recently the markets for USA gas was only the US and Canada.  But now we have built LNG plants to export it globally.  So we have access to global markets and can charge global market prices.

Reply

#4

'Kaliboo' pid='78922' datel Wrote:

'thg' pid='78920' dateline='<a href="tel:1483979 Wrote:

'Kaliboo' pid='78918' dateline='<a href="tel:1483977 Wrote:

I think I recall reading from the prior MIC that XOM has to approve any "new fairer deal" to dissenting shareholders.  In any case I think it is useful to start walking through how this may evolve.  I can get only this far.....

Case 1:

1.  Shareholder dissents according to process.

2.  IOC contacts shareholder with "new fairer deal."

3.  Shareholder accepts the deal.  End of story.

Case 2 (my guess):

1.  Steps 1 & 2 above are the same.

2.  Shareholder rejects the lowball offer from IOC.

3.  IOC and shareholder argue and neither side agrees.

4.  At some point court plugs back in and appoints a third party to listen to both sides and settle the situation.  Presumably the settlement value can go no lower than the new offer by IOC, but maybe is likely to go higher based on shareholder arguments.

So a fundamental question is what guidelines will be followed in establishing fair value?  That is the $64 thousand dollar question.  Here's my thoughts on the approaches and one I really like.

1.  Real Market approach.  This is no good for shareholders, because as I've said before in PNG there is NO MARKET for gas.  XOM is a monopoly.  No one can or will compete with them to buy IOC.  Period.  Even in a high LNG price environment (when Phil was there) XOM was the only deal we could get.  This situation will BEGIN to change ONLY AFTER TOT builds its own plant, but that now is unlikely.  Even then you have only two bidders for IOC - still no market IMHO.  So we've already learned that even though TOT plans to build a plant, they won't bother to compete with XOM to buy IOC.    "It's the monopoly....stupid," as politicians like to speak to each other.  Hopefully the court gets that point.  A "fair deal" is impossible in a monopolistic market.  Hopefully the court gets it.  Phil please strongly emphasize that point.

2.  Hypothetical Market approach.  To deal with the monoply in this case the court would need to force assumptions something like this.  Tell the 3rd party consultants who will establish the value to assume there were mutiple LNG plants with different owners OR alternatively, no LNG plants in PNG.  Then that puts all potential bidders on the same footing, however, small companies are blocked out of the latter case as they aren't going to build an LNG plan (we learned that lesson).  This case can be looked at from both an aggregate approach OR a sum of the parts approach to arrive at the fair value.  I would expect that a global view of LNG and natural gas prices would need to be examined to arrive at some unit value and costs.  This "hypothetical market approach" is what we hope for.  This approach also has to look at current and expected future LNG prices, as well as costs.  This can get really complicated because the costs and price assumptions as well as a minimum ROI have to be used to determine value - like doing a mini FID.  Costs are determined on the development scenario.  The lowest cost is to build on to the existing infrastructure - XOM's PNG LNG.  While this would probably yield a good value, it seems way to complicated with a bazillion assumptions.  A third party has to do it I think.

3.  Equivalent ROI and PVPAT Approach.  I like this concept.  I think it is most equitable and most doable.  HEre's a rough idea as to how it would be done using the companies own numbers.  In fact the court could order the companies to prepare it.  TOT and IOC and OSH are working on FID for the joint project and have several options, one being a stand alone new LNG plant.  They no doubt have run cost, price and economic analyses on all of these stand alone options using different costs and LNG prices.  Each set of assumptions generates its own profitability parameters like PVPAT and ROI, etc.  So ONE fair value for IOC shareholders would be to use the highest price for IOC assets which meets the minimum required profitability hurdles of TOT in a stand alone TOT operated LNG project excluding XOM participation.  Then generate a SECOND case where all players are joined together (XOM, TOT, OSH) which is the most likely outcome and use the highest price for IOC that yields the average of the MINIMUM profitability hurdles of all participants to deliver that scenario.  So now there are TWO different  valuations of IOC based on the minimum economic hurdles at which the companies would invest.  Simply average the two values and you have your new AVERAGE MAXIMUM "fair bid".  It is a maximum bid in the sense that it is derived based on minimum investment hurdles.  This AVERAGE MAXIMUM price for IOC will be fair to XOM because XOM will not be expending the captial required by a TOT stand alone case where unit costs will be much higher.  So by averaging the two numbers, the price XOM will pay for IOC will actually yield a much higher profitabilityu than the minimum XOM hurdles.  But there is one catch at least.  In order to satisfy shareholders the evaluation has to include ALL of IOC gas - 7+ TCF from E/A and 6.4+ TCF from Bobcat, Raptor and Triceratops including the recertification volume for E/A.  This latter point of course will drive the price of IOC ballistically upward as it should.  This is where there will be biggest push back. But somehow the court needs to fairly address the huge upside that XOM is capturing from these assets which have 3rd party volume estimates, not to mention a gigantic undrilled HC rich acerage position and many other assets, which shareholders will never share in by owning XOM shares as they would have owning IOC shares.  IOC mangement and BOD have eggregiously misled and mis represented the future of IOC to shareholders even into 2015 while rewarding themselves at excessively levels unheard of in industry, while they have drained the company and wasted capital and left shareholders completely in the dark as to why resource volumes at E/A have suddenly shrunk after a long run of increasing volumes and ever improving well and reservoir results.  The court would do will to use this approach to settle the gross injustices that shareholders have been subjected to.  What could that value be under this approach?  Multiples higher than the current offer IMHO.

Anyone got any other better approaches?


In response to your option 1 above:

Actually I think you may be overlooking something... The market for the gas is asia, just as Oil Search, Santos, and ExxonMobil have suggested in their separate releases regarding the Muruk-1 well and the Muruk resource which they have estimated at 2Tcfe and then assisted "The Australian" in valuing at the current spot buy price for LNG in Asia ~ $7/mcf. They have provided the market definition for Papua New Guinea derived gas. We can use this as the market definition and this will be "quite fair" because the major players in the Papua New Guinea gas industry made the definition.

The asian LNG price is rising, as is the asian demand for gas. This model prices InterOil's share of E/A to around ten times the current offer at retail, so there is a lot of fat contained in the XOM margin.

I disagree.  The market for the LNG is Asia and the world.  The market for the gas is PNG.  IOC does not have LNG to sell.  That's where the term "stranded gas" comes from.  You have to be able to get it to the market to sell it or there is no market.  Hence until recently the markets for USA gas was only the US and Canada.  But now we have built LNG plants to export it globally.  So we have access to global markets and can charge global market prices.

In my opinion there is only one way to calculate a fair value. This value should be based on NPV(=Net Present Value). For such a calculation it is necessary to make assumptions regarding the IOC business in the future (monetisation plan).  Therefore, I am very curious to see the MIC brochure.

Big Grin
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#5

'Relker' pid='78928' datel Wrote:

In my opinion there is only one way to calculate a fair value. This value should be based on NPV(=Net Present Value). For such a calculation it is necessary to make assumptions regarding the IOC business in the future (monetisation plan).  Therefore, I am very curious to see the MIC brochure.

[/quote]

For there to be any value some company has to be able to make a profit buying IOC to acquire the gas resources and then make investments to develop the fields and get the gas to an LNG plant where it can then be shipped to market.  When making these assessments all companies develop multiple development scenarios and then use their price premise for LNG prices to run economics on high, low and mid LNG price forecasts.  For a project to go to FID the company will have minimum profitability requirements that the profit calculations must pass on the mid case LNG price forecast and possibly the low case price scenario, depending on the risk level.  Big companies like XOM will have multiple projects in the pipeline simultaneously at different stages, but how these projects rank will determine what gets funded and what gets scrapped, slowed down, or sent back to the drawing board to improve profitability.  So a fair price for IOC assets should enable a buyer to make a reasonable ROI at least in line with the risk being taken.  E/A is mostly derisked for the volumes reported.  PNG as a country for developing gas fields and running an LNG business is mostly derisked as evidenced by what XOM has already done.  So far only a fraction of the 100+TCF resource (by USGS estimates) in the Eastern Papuan Basin have been discovered, so there is still a lot of upside and much of it may be sitting on IOC prime acreage.  So in my opinion this is now rather low risk for XOM in buying IOC.  LNG prices are the main concern.   So the profitability threshold value, be it ROI, NPV, whatever, for investment decisions, need not be as high as if there were no gas discovered and/or no LNG plant already operating in PNG, since a profit is virtually assured since in addition to being a low risk development, it will be among the lowest cost gas field/LNG developments.  I suppose the pads for the existing Elk/Antelope wells could be used to quickly complete the drilling program for the upstream part of the project.  Huge savings there with pads in place and wells which might be re-entered and sidetracked if necessary.   So when making calculations the profit calcuations need to account for the fact that this is mostly de-risked for the E/A part and being served up on a sliver platter for fast execution  from investment to first gas going forward.

So a fair value needs to consider these things.  Even still Phil has made note that whatever the final price is, it will still fall short because fields of this size tend to grow once they start producing and that's just E/A.  The value is tremendous and they know it and their current price is a steal.

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#6
All analyst reports are based on NPV calculations. ROI is translated in internal rate of return (=discount factor). I agree with you that not all analysts calculate with the same discount factor but generally this is approx 10%. More difficult is the establishement of the various business scenarios. The probability of success of all the scenarios together is 100%. As long as FID is not ready 1 scenario will keep a zero value. That is the reason why I want to sell the company after FID.
Big Grin
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