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Trouble in the Netherlands..
#1


Underwater: The Netherlands Falls Prey to Economic Crisis


By Christoph Schult and Anne Seith

Photos
REUTERS

The Netherlands, Berlin's most important ally in pushing for greater budgetary discipline in Europe, has fallen into an economic crisis itself. The once exemplary economy is suffering from huge debts and a burst real estate bubble, which has stalled growth and endangered jobs.

Michel Scheepens is familiar with risk. The 41-year-old oversees the energy market for the Dutch bank ING, and it's his job to determine whether his employer should finance such projects as a wind farm in Cyprus or a gas-fired power plant in Turkey. Until now, it was always other people's money that was involved.

For some time, however, Scheepens has been experiencing what a poor investment feels like on a personal level. Six years ago, the father of three bought half of a duplex for his family in the commuter town of Nieuw-Vennep, near the North Sea coast. The red brick building cost €430,000 ($552,000), but the bank generously offered him a loan of €500,000, so that there was enough money left over for renovations, along with notary and community fees. Scheepens had intended to resell the house after a few years, as is common in the Netherlands. But then prices tumbled following the Lehman bankruptcy. If the family were to sell the house today, it would have to pay the lender €60,000. His house is "onder water," as Scheepens says.

"Underwater" is a good description of the crisis in a country where large parts of the territory are below sea level. Ironically, the Netherlands, once a model economy, now faces the kind of real estate crisis that has only affected the United States and Spain until now. Banks in the Netherlands have also pumped billions upon billions in loans into the private and commercial real estate market since the 1990s, without ensuring that borrowers had sufficient collateral.

Private homebuyers, for example, could easily find banks to finance more than 100 percent of a property's price. "You could readily obtain a loan for five times your annual salary," says Scheepens, "and all that without a cent of equity." This was only possible because property owners were able to fully deduct mortgage interest from their taxes.

Instead of paying off the loans, borrowers normally put some of the money into an investment fund, month after month, hoping for a profit. The money was to be used eventually to pay off the loan, at least in part. But it quickly became customary to expect the value of a given property to increase substantially. Many Dutch savers expected that the resale of their homes would generate enough money to pay off the loans, along with a healthy profit.

An Economy on the Brink

More than a decade ago, the Dutch central bank recognized the dangers of this euphoria, but its warnings went unheeded. Only last year did the new government, under conservative-liberal Prime Minister Mark Rutte, amend the generous tax loopholes, which gradually began to expire in January. But now it's almost too late. No nation in the euro zone is as deeply in debt as the Netherlands, where banks have a total of about €650 billion in mortgage loans on their books.

Consumer debt amounts to about 250 percent of available income. By comparison, in 2011 even the Spaniards only reached a debt ratio of 125 percent.

The Netherlands is still one of the most competitive countries in the European Union, but now that the real estate bubble has burst, it threatens to take down the entire economy with it. Unemployment is on the rise, consumption is down and growth has come to a standstill. Despite tough austerity measures, this year the government in The Hague will violate the EU deficit criterion, which forbid new borrowing of more than 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

It's a heavy burden, especially for Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who is also the new head of the Euro Group, and now finds himself in the unexpected role of being both a watchdog for the monetary union and a crisis candidate.

Even €46 billion in austerity measures are apparently not enough to remain within the EU debt limit. Although Dijsselbloem has announced another €4.3 billion in cuts in public service and healthcare, they will only take effect in 2014.

"Sticking the knife in even more deeply" would be "very, very unreasonable," Social Democrat Dijsselbloem told German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, in an attempt to justify the delay. It's the kind of rhetoric normally heard from Europe's stricken southern countries. The adverse effects of living beyond one's means have become apparent since the financial crisis began. Many of the tightly calculated financing models are no longer working out, and citizens can hardly pay their debts anymore. The prices of commercial and private real estate, which were absurdly high for a time, are sinking dramatically. The once-booming economy is stalling.

Unemployment on the Rise

"A vicious cycle develops in such situations," says Jörg Rocholl, president of the European School of Management and Technology in Berlin and a member of the council of academic advisors to the German Finance Ministry. "Customers have too much debt and cannot service their loans. This causes problems for the banks, which are no longer supplying enough money to the economy. This leads to an economic downturn and high unemployment, which makes loan repayment even more difficult."

The official unemployment rate has already climbed to 7.7 percent. In reality, it is probably much higher, but that has been masked until now by a demographic group called the ZZP. The "Zelfstandigen zonder personeel" ("Self-employed without employees"Wink are remotely related to the German model of the "Ich-AG" ("Me, Inc."Wink. About 800,000 ZZPers currently work in the Netherlands.

One of them is Rob Huisman. The 47-year-old lives with his wife and son in Santpoort, near Haarlem. In 2006 Huisman, an IT specialist, left his position with a large consulting firm to start his own business. It went well at first, with Huisman earning €100 an hour. But over time many customers, both governmental and private, slashed the fees they were willing to pay. Sometimes jobs were simply deleted altogether. "For companies it's worthwhile to let their permanent employees go and then take on temporary work contracts," says the IT expert. "It saves them the social security costs."

There is cutthroat competition among the self-employed, who are undercutting each other to secure occasional jobs. "If you don't accept a job, someone else will snap it up," says Huisman. In addition, he is unable to pay contributions to his retirement fund at the moment. "We are living largely on our savings," he says.

No End in Sight

The Dutch were long among Europe's most diligent savers, and in the crisis many are holding onto their money even more tightly, which is also toxic to the economy. "One of the main problems is declining consumption," says Johannes Hers of the Centraal Planbureau in The Hague, the council of experts at the Economics Ministry.

His office expects a 0.5-percent decline in growth for 2013. Some 755 companies declared bankruptcy in February, the highest number since records began in 1981. The banking sector is also laying off thousands of employees at the moment.

Because of the many mortgage loans on the books, the financial industry is extremely inflated, so much so that the total assets of all banks are four-and-a-half times the size of economic output.

In February, the government was forced to nationalize SNS Bank, the country's fourth-largest bank, because it had a large portfolio of bad loans for commercial real estate. The remaining banks only want to securitize a portion of their giant loan portfolios and resell the securities through a special mortgage bank -- primarily to the country's pension funds, where the Dutch have put away large sums for retirement.

Young families like the Scheepens, who have bought a home in recent years, are now hoping that they can at least keep their jobs. Although their duplex has lost value, they can still make the monthly payments.

But the cuts are getting closer. A neighbor recently lost his job, and well-educated people can no longer find jobs. "There is no end to the crisis in sight," says Scheepens.

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#2
Car sales are down 30% in March compared to last year..
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#3
We noted these troubles earlier..
http://seekingalpha.com/article/473141-t...herlaaands
http://seekingalpha.com/article/858861-h...etherlands
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#4


Debt-crippled Holland falls victim to EMU blunders as property slump deepens



The eurozone’s slow suffocation is going Dutch. Each extra month of slump caused by Europe’s negligent authorities is pushing Holland closer to a debt-deflation trap.


Average net household wealth in Holland is just €170,000, compared with Germany (€195,000), France (€233,000), Italy (€275,000), Spain (€291,000) and Cyprus (€670,000) Photo: Reuters

6:49PM BST 01 May 2013

CommentsComments

The coalition of Mark Rutte has belatedly woken up to the danger. Last month it retreated from pro-cyclical tightening, delaying €4.3bn in budget austerity. By then Mr Rutte’s totemic worship of EU deficit targets had invited the ridicule of the official Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB), which said Dutch leaders did not seem to understand how private credit busts interact with fiscal cuts to create havoc.

“The Dutch government’s inability to acknowledge the damage done by austerity despite mounting evidence is a case of 'cognitive dissonance’,” it told the Financial Times.

Yet this is not at root a case of botched fiscal policy. It is a case of misaligned monetary policy. The Netherlands offers a salutary lesson of what can happen to a rich sophisticated economy caught in a post-bubble crunch once it has lost control of its currency, central bank and monetary levers. This would have happened to Britain without the Bank of England, and the US without the Fed.

The Dutch crisis has crept up quietly, though hedge funds have been nibbling for months. Most people lump the Netherlands together with Germany, Finland and Austria, the hardline AAA fist-thumpers who dictate terms to others.

Unemployment was very low until the dam broke. It is now soaring as fast as in Cyprus. The rate has doubled over the past two years, jumping from 7.7pc to 8.1pc in the single month of March. The economy has been in recession since early 2011.

The Netherlands bears striking resemblance to Spain and Ireland two or so years ago,” says Stephen Jen from SLJ Macro Partners. Holland has a fat current account surplus of 8.3pc of GDP and a savings rate of 26pc, but Mr Jen says such “virtues” did not prevent Japan succumbing to the after-shocks of its housing crash.

Holland’s errors were made long ago when tax policy and regulation combined to produced a housing bubble to match Britain’s follies under Gordon Brown.

As in Britain - or Japan when it buckled in 1990 - there is a long-term housing shortage. Rabobank says the overhang of unsold homes is 228,000. That is bad but not disastrous. The crisis stems from rampant credit, not rampant building.

Regulators let the average loan-to-value ratio of new mortgages soar to 120pc at the peak. Since mortgage interest is tax deductible, around 60pc of the entire stock of mortgages is interest-only.

Unlike the Bank of Spain, which tried to “lean against the wind”, Dutch officials saw no need for extra buffers to offset the (then) ultra-loose policies of the European Central Bank, geared to German needs when Germany was in slump. The ratio of household debt to disposable income peaked at 266pc in 2010, the highest in EMU and almost a world record.

The denoument is well under way. Dutch house prices have fallen 18pc, leaving a quarter of all mortgages “onder water”, and there is surely worse to come. Standard & Poor’s expects prices to drop 5.5pc this year, and slide again in 2014. This is infecting everything. “Consumer sentiment in the Netherlands is at much the same level now as at the depths of the global financial crisis,” said Ken Wattret, an analyst at BNP.

There has been little forced selling of property so far, which is lucky since Dutch banks are up to their necks in mortgage portfolios. They face a huge “funding gap”. The loan-deposit ratio (LTD) is 183pc, compared with roughly 70pc in the US and Japan, 100pc in Germany or 120pc in Britain.

This means that Dutch lenders - like Northern Rock before them - must rely on the capital markets to roll over debts. This is courting fate. “The persistently high LTD ratio makes Dutch banks particularly vulnerable to a scenario in which market confidence evaporates,” said the Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) in its latest stability report.

In February the government was forced to nationalise SNS REALL - the fourth biggest bank - after it came to grief in commercial property. One had assumed that the great wealth of the Dutch people would provide an ample cushion against shocks but fresh data from the ECB - if reliable - show that average net household wealth is just €170,000, compared with Germany (€195,000), France (€233,000), Italy (€275,000), Spain (€291,000) and Cyprus (€670,000), so perhaps we need to think again.

Holland’s travails would be manageable if the EMU authorities - including their own leaders - had not pushed the eurozone into a second downward leg of the Long Slump, and above all if the ECB had kept "nominal GDP" growth for the eurozone on an even keel of 5pc, which it can easily do if it wishes.

Instead, the ECB has engineered a Japan-style liquidity trap. Broad M3 money growth has slowed to 2.6pc. It contracted in March. Core inflation has fallen to a record low of 0.4pc, once austerity taxes are stripped out. This is one shock away from debt-deflation.

The effect of Europe’s contractionary policies is that nominal GDP - which is what matters for debt dynamics - is shrinking in a string of countries. It fell last year in Holland under the “production” measure. The great edifice of private and public debt is growing on a shrivelling base.

This debt-compound effect is why it is so ruinous for Europe to let the depression grind on, hoping somehow that nature will work its cure. It is why monetarists around the world are so exasperated with the ECB.

The ever-growing brotherhood of damaged nations could of course seize control of the ECB’s Governing Council and ram through a dose of Japanese "Abenomics" over the protest of the Bundesbank, which is loftily indifferent to the Taylor Rule on output gaps. That rule, by the way, shows that monetary policy is too tight even for Germany.

Yet the victims recoil. As one ex-governor told me: “We know that if we did that, we would destroy political consent for the euro in Germany, so we can’t do it.”

Well then, accept your fate.

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#5


Standard & Poor’s Poor Analysis of the Dutch Economy


Bas Jacobs

Today, Standard and Poor’s lowered it’s rating on Dutch sovereign debt. S&P is certainly right to mention low growth as one of the biggest problems in the Netherlands. And, I can only hope that Dutch policy makers finally start to be concerned with growth and unemployment, rather than being obsessed with budget deficit. However, it does not help at all that the Dutch sovereign is downgraded based on a poor understanding of the workings of the Dutch economy and the Dutch government finances.

S&P downgrades the Dutch government by referring to disappointingly low growth, but this is in no small part due to the massive amount of austerity the Dutch government is imposing on the economy, in addition to the balance-sheet problems in the private sector (see more below). However, on austerity, S&P remains suspiciously silent, probably because S&P has in the past repeatedly issued warnings that ratings would indeed be lowered if deficits larger than 3-percent would persist. See for example here.

For many years now, the Dutch government has been behaving as a dog chasing its own tail. Austerity has sent the Dutch economy into a downward spiral. Every year economic growth is lower than projected. Budget deficits are larger than projected. And, hence, every year the Dutch government announces ad hoc and ill-reasoned austerity packages so as not to breach the Brussels’ 3-percent deficit limit.

Between 2011-2017 the government takes an historically unprecedented 9% of GDP in deficit-reducing measures – all relative to baseline projections for Dutch public finances that are made at the start of each new government period (Suyker, 2013). Approximately half of which are tax increases and the other half are budget cuts.

The great irony is that every recent Dutch Minister of Finance pursued more and more austerity to retain the AAA-rating. But, today’s S&P report demonstrated that all these austerity efforts were to no avail; their reward for their painful efforts has been a downgrade.

Austerity was and remains unsound economic policy as long as the Dutch economy remains in a balance-sheet recession, with a large private mortgage-debt overhang, banks with dirty balance sheets contracting credit and pension funds coping with funding shortfalls, cutting pension entitlements and raising pension contributions.*

Under current macro-economic conditions (debt-overhang, banks contracting credit and ECB-rates stuck at the zero lower bound) is it nearly impossible to reduce public debts through austerity, as Delong and Summers (2012) and others have demonstrated. Due to high multipliers output contracts, unemployment rises, firms go bankrupt, banks get into deeper problems, the deficit hardly comes down and public debt keeps on rising.

Indeed, during 2011-2014 the Dutch government takes 6,5% of GDP in deficit-reducing measures, while the budget deficit only shrinks with a tiny 1% of GPD. And, gross public debt further increases from 65,7 percent GDP in 2011 to an expected 76,3 percent GDP in 2014 (CPB, 2013).

S&P apparently believes in a world where basic macro-economic accounting identities do not hold. Spending equals income. Saving equals borrowing. Not all sectors in the Dutch economy can simultaneously stop spending and start saving (deleveraging) without triggering a collapse in aggregate demand. Today, S&P finally discovered that basic macro-economic accounting identities do hold. Surprise! S&P downgrades the Dutch government for being so supportive in destroying economic growth.

An even greater concern is that S&P has no idea about the current state of the Dutch public finances. In fact, the Netherlands has 99 problems, but sustainability of the government finances isn’t one. If so, why downgrade the Dutch sovereign?

Fiscal gap calculations for the sustainability of the Dutch public finances point to a negative fiscal gap (Lukkezen en Suyker, 2013). That is: the Dutch government has a long-term fiscal surplus! The fiscal gap is the annuity of the present value of future deficits (Auerbach, 1994). Based on current projections regarding tax revenue and government expenditure, the net present value of future tax revenue is larger than the net present value of future expenditures.** I am not aware of another advanced country without natural resources having a long-term fiscal surplus.

The Netherlands achieved this surplus during the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Indeed, the favorable state of Dutch public finances has been bolstered by various policy measures taken by recent governments: raising the statutory retirement age to 67, gradually reducing the generosity of the mortgage-rent tax deduction and long-term reforms in health care, amongst other things.

Despite all these policy measures, the first and foremost reason for the negative fiscal gap is that future tax revenue will substantially increase due to the taxation of pension benefits. With the ageing of the population, private pension funds start paying out pensions. Pension contributions are tax deductible, accrual of pension wealth remains untaxed, and pension benefits are taxed.

The Netherlands has accumulated a massive amount of pension wealth of approximately 165% of GDP (DNB, 2013). Hence, the Dutch government has an gigantic tax claim on future pension benefits amounting to about 66% of GDP (approx. 40% taxes over 165% GDP pension wealth).

S&P and many foreign observers, but also Dutch public officials, consistently ignore this hugely important asset in their assessments of the Dutch public finances. Current gross public debt of 75% of GDP almost entirely cancels against the tax claim on future pensions of 66% of GDP.

In addition, the Dutch government obtains future revenue from natural gas sales, which represents an asset of 22% of GDP. And, the Dutch government has additional assets worth 92% of GDP (capital assets 65% GDP, financial assets 27% GDP), see also Lukkezen and Suyker (2013). All this implies that the Dutch government has positive net assets, not net debt.

If the government has positive net assets, low growth is not bad, as S&P suggests. Lower (structural) growth is bad when there is a positive level of debt. However, when there is a positive level of assets sustainability of public finances improves with lower growth. Intuitively, it easier to finance future outlays from initial assets if future government expenditures grow at a lower rate. Calculations in CPB (2010) demonstrate that a 0,5% lower structural economic growth per year reduces the fiscal gap in Dutch public finances with 0,6% of GDP.

Further, I am rather skeptical that the Dutch economy would enter a long-term low-growth scenario with labor-productivity growth lagging chronically behind 1.7% per year, which is currently assumed in the sustainability calculations. During 1913-1994 average labor productivity grew at 1.6% per year, and this period included two world wars and the Great Depression (Van Ark and De Jong, 1996).

However, I am deeply worried about hysteresis (DeLong and Summers, 2012). Productive capacity might get lost forever if temporary unemployment would become permanent and firms would unnecessarily go bankrupt, thereby destroying firm-specific knowledge, technology and human capital.

To conclude it’s highly unlikely that the Dutch government runs into any budgetary problems at any time soon. The following S&P statement is therefore nonsense: “Fiscal space is increasingly limited, however, with the government’s net debt expected to increase to 71% of GDP in 2014.”  Apart from the silly 3-percent deficit rule imposed by Brussels, there is absolutely no danger that the Dutch public finances spiral out of control if budget deficits were about to increase during the upcoming years. (Note also that S&P confuses gross and net public debt.)

S&P is moreover inconsistent if it tells the world: “That said, we do not expect the cost of debt service to meaningfully increase.” If S&P really believes that the outlook for the Dutch public finances deteriorates, as their downgrade suggests, then this implies that the costs of debt service increase, and not remain constant. But, again, this demonstrates that standard economic logic is not the biggest strength of S&P. Indeed, today’s bond market markets remained rightfully stoic to the downgrade of the Dutch government as interest rates on 10-year government bonds remained unchanged at 2,02 percent. S&P follows the market, rather than the other way round.

Sadly, I would not be surprised that Dutch policy makers would take an economically highly inconsistent credit-rating report to justify even more austerity, rather than take the S&P report as a wake-up call to relax austerity and help the private sector restore its balance sheets.

References

Ark, B. van, and H. de Jong (1996), “Accounting for Growth in The Netherlands since 1913”, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Research Memorandum, GD-26.

Auerbach, A. J. (1994), “The U.S. Fiscal Problem: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We’re Going”, in: S. Fischer and J. Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Cambridge-MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.

CPB (2010), Vergrijzing Verdeeld, Den Haag: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

CPB (2013), Macro Economische Verkenningen 2014, Den Haag: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

DNB (2013), Pension Fund Statics, Dutch Central Bank: http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/financieele-instellingen/pensioenfondsen/macro-economische-statistiek-pensioenfondsen/index.jsp

DeLong, J. B., and L. H. Summers (2012), “Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 44, (1), 233-297.

Lukkezen, J., and W. Suyker (2013), De Naakte feiten over de Nederlandse Overheidsschuld. CPB Achtergronddocument, 5 juni, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

Suyker, W. (2013), Tekortreducerende Maatregelen 2011–2017, MEV2014-versie, CPB Achtergronddocument, 17 september, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

* This is all somewhat paradoxical, since the Netherlands has positive net wealth. The problem is that most assets are illiquid (houses and pensions) and cannot be used to bring down debts.

** Two caveats are in order here: CPB assumes a too low growth rate for health-care expenditures and the value of government interventions in and guarantees for the financial sector are excluded. Problems in a banking sector with a balance-sheet total of more than 4 times GDP could seriously undermine the health of public finances.

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#6
The article above by Danny Jacobs is really, really depressing. The public sector is about the only one without serious (or even any) balance sheet problems, yet what do they do? Chase their own tail. 6% austerity to achieve a 1% reduction in the deficit, and at what cost? Derailing the economy.

And the great irony, they lost the triple A status anyway (not that it means all that much..).

And why are they pursuing policies that are so clearly counterproductive? Well, they can't lecture the eurozone periphery if they don't stay within the 3% deficit norm themselves..

This is, well, madness.
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