The fact that the value of CVRs is largely dependent on future events presents challenging taxation and accounting issues which I explained in an earlier thread (Tax Proceeds of Deal).
An additional risk that IOC shareholders (as potential CVR recipients) will be required to bear is CVRs’ lack of liquidity. Although some CVRs are registered tradable securities, the majority are non-transferable because the issuing company (in this case OSH) does not want to incur the additional cost, disclosure obligations, and legal responsibilities associated with registering them with the ASX and/or the SEC. Although OSH has stated that they may register the CVRs, we do not know this for a fact. Even registered “tradable” CVRs are often extremely illiquid because their value is so highly speculative.
CVR holders also have little legal protection because it is unclear what, if any, enforcement mechanism is available should CVR covenants be breached – short of expensive and protracted individual litigation. As noted in the SHU thread "World Class Gas Resources" by Oliver.Gump, the OSH/IOC deal includes language that "No member of the Certification Subcommittee owes any duty of care, or will otherwise be liable, to the CVR Note holders in respect of the performance of their duties as members of the Certification Subcommittee." Without the ability to enforce a 'duty of care', there is, effectively, no fiduciary duty to act in shareholder's best interests. This is a troubling clause in the deal.
The most troubling aspect of CVRs from our standpoint, however, is the way these type instruments redistribute risk. In a normal transaction, the would-be corporate acquirer bears considerable risk in negotiating the deal price: an offer that is too low will likely be rejected by the target’s board, or superseded by a higher offer from a competing suitor. If the acquiror pays top dollar, however, it bears the risk that, if the acquisition is not profitable, it has paid too much. The creative use of CVRs can transfer much of the risk normally borne by acquirers (OSH) to the shareholders in the target corporation (Us!). Instead of offering more for the target and bearing downside risk, the acquirer (OSH) can use less cash or stock, and effectively defer part of the purchase price to a later date (in this case, the certification/payment date for E/A assets) and, additionally, defer any risk of the value of the CVR being less than anticipated.
The fact that we, as shareholders who are being offered CVRs for our shares, do not know any of the internal details regarding the current valuation of E/A (and may not know such details before voting to accept this deal) is very troubling--to me, this is the most troubling aspect of this deal. We are being asked to take a very large risk with very little information on which to base our bet--and if the eventual deal contains CVRs, it will be a "bet" by any interpretation.
Much more information needs to be provided to IOC shareholders regarding the current estimated certification amounts (based on internal Total, IOC, and OSH estimates) as well as the available appraisal company estimates (including the upcoming OSH appraisal results for E/A). With such information made public, I would be far less likely to be worried about the eventual 'deal' certification coming in too low. It may well be a reasonable choice to accept the deal with the CVRs, but, for now, we simply do not have the information necessary to make an informed judgement.


It's hard to plan for theses CVRs in a taxable account.