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European banks after Cyprus..
#1


This brave new world


Cyprus may not be a template but as Pawel Morski said, the actual template is probably not going to look all that different.

We’ve already written a little bit about this and on Thursday Barclays published a note suggesting the Cyprus mess, plus the incoming common resolution framework, might wipe €15bn annually from the profits of Europe’s biggest banks. The draft of said framework is scheduled to come into play by 2015 with the bail-in tool, which had been delayed until 2018, perhaps being moved forward. We await clarity from European legislators this summer, if the summer ever arrives.

Concerning Barclays’ €15bn figure, it’s made up of a few different, but connected, elements.

First, as Frances Coppela put it: the deal that has now been struck in Cyprus turns senior bonds and deposits over €100,000 into contingent capital. Or put another way, uncovered depositors should think of themselves as senior unsecured creditors rather than depositors. And it obviously makes sense to then ask how much funding costs will rise with that risk.

Barclays estimates that across major eurozone countries (with admittedly large variations — 59 per cent uncovered in Italy and 22 per cent in Spain) there are almost €10tn of deposits. Of those, around two thirds are covered by Deposit Guarantee Schemes (i.e. below €100,000) and the rest are not. One of the striking things about that split is that there is currently only a tiny difference in deposit rates between uninsured and insured. Uncovered depositors haven’t felt in any real extra danger. That is likely to change.

The Barclays analysts took a shot at estimating the possible increase in funding costs by extrapolating from the cost of insuring the banks’ bonds — the lower the CDS, the safer the bank and/or its sovereign. From their note:

Having established the CDS of each bank, we then need to convert that into a potential uplift in funding costs for uncovered deposits. We assume that the uplift is 10bps for the quartile 1 banks – in line with the selection of rates we sampled in Figure 9 – and rises by 15bps increments for each subsequent quartile. So a third quartile bank would have an uplift of 40bps (10bps +15bps +15bps) in funding costs on their uncovered deposits.

They got a near six per cent average hit on earnings with a wide range (the final column in the table below takes into account an expanded DGS with more on that below). Even if that is perhaps too harsh, it is still illustrative:

Even if costs stay down, it would be fair to say that European depositors will be much more aware of risk and ready to jump more quickly when trouble appears.

So to the common resolution framework. As the Barclays analysts underline, the recent march of eurozone events has been littered with unpredictable credit events — SNS, IBRC, Cyprus.

Of course there are also instances of credit protection (Monte dei Paschi, Dexia etc) but the danger now lies in a Cypriot direction, so the sooner an actual framework is in place the better.

We’ve put a note on such frameworks in the usual place. In short, if a bank is on the verge of failure, authorities will first try to attempt to recapitalise it by writing down or converting into equity outstanding capital instruments, before applying other resolution tools. If writing down capital securities is insufficient to return the entity to viability, authorities will apply one or more resolution tools, which are: 1) sale of business; 2) bridge institution; 3) asset separation; and 4) bail-in.

Related to that common resolution framework are properly funded European DGS’s — as opposed to a pan-European DGS which isn’t likely to appear soon.

It’s probably worth adding that national DGS schemes are a bit fecked during a real banking crisis… and from that a depressing train of logic threatens. Will return to that idea briefly at the bottom.

For now, back over the Barclays (emphasis ours):

It’s obviously hard to know exactly what the final calibration of the EU DGS will be. The events in Cyprus have in all likelihood increased both the pace at which policymakers will move towards stronger DGS but also potentially the level of the funds themselves. In the absence of any further proposals from Brussels, at this stage perhaps the most reasonable approach is to take the average of the European Parliament’s and Council’s proposals – i.e., the national DGSs will require ex ante funding equal to 1.25% of covered deposits, built up over the next 12.5 years. Co-incidentally, this would bring the EU broadly in line with the Dodd-Frank legislation in the US. On this basis, Figure 28 suggests that EU DGSs would have an aggregate funding shortfall of c€80bn, with nearly three-quarters of this stemming from Germany, France and the UK.

On top of this, the EC proposal is also looking to harmonise and simplify the definition of which deposits are eligible for guarantees. Specifically, the current DGS rules across the EU allow for different countries to include or exclude 14 categories of deposits that can be subject to deposit guarantees. So, for instance, deposits of large companies are excluded from the UK’s DGS but included in France. Under the new proposals, virtually everything will be included except for deposits from financial institutions and from governments. However, when we compare eligibility levels across countries (after adjusting for things like deposits from ‘Other Financial Institutions&rsquoWink, the variability is in fact quite small. So harmonising eligibility rules may not make a substantial difference….

Overall, filling the shortfall on the DGS funding could cost banks under our coverage c€34bn. This is equal to around 25% of 2014e PBT – which, if spread out over the next 12.5, years would only amount to around 2% of PBT per annum…

Whilst the impact at a sector level is relatively modest, both Figures 30 and 31 suggest that the bulk of the earnings risk is concentrated in relatively few names. Commerzbank, Sabadell, Credit Agricole, Popular and Lloyds Banking Group all appear the most affected, with an annual earnings drag of between 5-6%. This is driven by a combination of factors, but principally stems from having a low level of existing ex ante funding in domestic DGSs coupled with weak underlying profitability.

There is a suggestion, as part of the common resolution framework, that authorities create a bridge bank as part of a bank resolution process which the banks would have to contribute to. The Barclays analysts suggest banks will face a charge equivalent to one per cent of covered deposits in every EU jurisdiction that they operate in.

Here’s everything in one big table — the potential increase in funding costs for uncovered deposits, the estimated costs of funding national DGS and the proposed bridge bank. Commerzbank makes up the biggest portion of that near $15bn total figure which would take an 11 per cent bite out of aggregate annual profits (click to enlarge):

That’s just an estimate of the direct cost to the banks post-Cyprus and doesn’t take into account higher borrowing costs or increased risk-taking by banks paying out higher rates for example. It’s the net costs that need to be taken into account anyway. If we are overall better off… we are overall better off.

But it’s hard to not worry about this resolution scheme coming into play without a real banking union, including having a pan-European deposit guarantee scheme in place. As economist Paul de Grauwe wrote, the responsibility for the euro-crisis is shared and pushing the risk of bank failures firmly within national borders could backfire badly, precipitating further banking crises.

The way Europeans treated Cyprus suggests sharing the pain isn’t high on the agenda, while as the Economist’s Charlemagne pointed out, Germany has back-pedalled on banking union ever since it was first mooted.

It is possible, as JPMorgan economist Malcolm Barr suggests, that German commitment to banking union isn’t fading and they are maybe looking to shrink the banking system in the periphery. As part of that, they want to push legacy problems in the banking sector back to the host nation to be adjusted. But either way it might be nice to do these things in a different order. Although, that sentence does presuppose an ‘order’ exists…

Related links:
Cyprus crisis to hit European banks hard – FT
How to interpret an ECB press conference: April 4th, annotated highlights – Pawel Morski
Cyprus and the financing of banks – Coppola Comment
Cyprus upends bank capital structure – FT Long Short

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#2


Rehn: big bank depositors could bear cost of bank failure



People with big deposits could suffer a ‘haircut’ under planned European Union law if a bank fails, the EU's economic affairs chief Olli Rehn said.


"Cyprus was a special case ... but the upcoming directive assumes that investor and depositor liability will be carried out in case of a bank restructuring or a wind-down," Mr Rehn, the European Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner.

"But there is a very clear hierarchy, at first the shareholders, then possibly the unprotected investments and deposits. However, the limit of €100,000 (£85,000) is sacred, deposits smaller than that are always safe."

Mr Rehn was referring to a directive being drafted by the European Commission on bank safety which would set out investor liability in the law of member states.

He was speaking in an interview with Finnish TV after Cyprus last month forced richer depositors to suffer heavy losses in order to secure a €10bn bail-out from the EU and the International Monetary Fund.

Cyprus had initially planned to make people with deposits under the crucial €100,000 mark to take a cut also, before backtracking in the face of an outcry. Smaller deposits are supposed to be protected by state guarantees.

Mats Persson, director of think-tank Open Europe said: "Rehn was only re-stating what's in an EU proposal tabled in 2012, which quite sensibly suggests a mechanism whereby first, investors and secondly, large depositors - rather than taxpayers - foot the bill when a bank goes bust.

“However, there's so much uncertainty around the precedent set by the Cyprus bail-out that his comments may still cause some jitters."

Mr Rehn also said that the European Central Bank should launch fresh action to help boost the recession-hit euro zone economy.


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#3


Of political power and dual-currencies in Cyprus


Some post-Cyprus thoughts from Citi’s Buiter et al… first on rolling capital controls and the chances of a new Cypriot pound being forced into existence (our emphasis):

The lack of internal convertibility of euro notes (through the limitations on cash withdrawals and on electronic payments) will, if they persist for more than a few weeks, likely lead to a search for alternative media of exchange for internal transactions. IOUs of large, respected enterprises could for example be countersigned and start to circulate more widely as media of exchange and means of payment. This was the case, for instance, during the 1970 bank strike in Ireland, uncleared cheques were made negotiable (like bills of exchange) and pubs and shops served as credit verifiers. These could later develop into more full-fledged parallel currencies, if internal euro liquidity in Cyprus remains very scarce.

If a parallel currency developed, the New Cypriot Pound (NCP), say, its impact on the speed and cost of the necessary downward adjustment of real wages and international competitiveness would depend on whether domestic wage and price setting would shift from using the euro as numéraire to using the NCP, and on whether, if the NCP were to become the new unit of account, contracting and invoicing currency for domestic transactions, these NCP money wages and prices would be sticky in nominal terms, rather than increasing in line with the increasing value of the euro in terms of NPCs.

The external inconvertibility of the onshore euro will likely lead to financial innovation even before the limited internal convertibility of deposits and onshore euros. Since a euro note within the jurisdiction of the Cypriot authorities is no longer freely convertible into a euro note outside their jurisdiction, the incentives for exchanging the one for the other at a non-unitary exchange rate (and with the Cypriot euro note at a discount) exist.18 The means are not hard to find. Cypriots planning a holiday abroad with friends abroad planning a holiday in Cyprus could make mutually advantageous and effectively untraceable currency swaps, possibly involving time delays. Companies with cross-border activities and other entities with legal personality can use a wide variety of stratagems to avoid and evade the administrative restrictions imposed on the free movement of capital, deposits, currency and credit across the Cypriot border. At a one-for-one exchange rate of ‘onshore’ euro currency, euro-denominated deposits and credit for their ‘offshore’ counterparts, there is almost certainly a massive excess supply of onshore euros and euro-denominated financial instruments.

The ad-hoc, pair-wise matching of buyers and sellers of onshore euros and eurodenominated instruments will, if the controls remain in place, rapidly evolve into a still informal and unofficial, but much more organised and efficient ‘curb market’, involving specialized market makers and intermediaries. The “black market” price of the onshore euro will be well below the official one-for-one exchange rate with the offshore euro. We think it will, if controls last more than a few weeks, become a useful indicator of the exchange rate of a new, distinct Cypriot currency that would emerge if Cyprus should exit the monetary union.

Should the capital controls, exchange controls, currency controls and deposit controls last, the gradual development of an alternative internal currency to cope with the scarcity of onshore currency and deposits, and the creation of a black market exchange rate between onshore and offshore euros could merge and produce a full-fledged parallel currency. These developments would be greatly accelerated if and when Cyprus moves towards euro area exit.

And on a related note:

In that important sense, Cyprus already is, de facto, not a part of the Eurozone at this moment. In another sense, Cyprus remains a de facto member of the Eurozone as long as the banks of Cyprus have access to Eurosystem funding, either through conventional repo operations with the Eurosystem available through the Central Bank of Cyprus but for the risk of the Eurosystem as a whole, or through the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) provided by the Central bank of Cyprus, subject to the approval of two thirds of the 23-member Governing Council of the ECB but supposedly for the risk of the Central Bank of Cyprus (and the Cypriot sovereign standing behind it) rather than for the risk of the Eurosystem as a whole.

Both sources of bank funding are subject to the creditworthiness of the borrowing banks and the quality of the collateral they can offer. For Cyprus, regular Eurosystem funding of most of its banks is a thing of the past because of the poor creditworthiness of the banks and the collateral they can offer. This will be restarted only once the ECB’s Governing Council is confident that both the banks and the collateral they offer are of minimal acceptable quality. The less exacting standards for eligible counterparties and collateral at the ELA will probably make it possible for the Cypriot banks to fund themselves through that mechanism. However, the ability of a two-thirds majority on the ECB’s Governing Council to stop ELA funding means that the continued membership of Cyprus in the Eurosystem is dependent on it maintaining the support of a blocking minority on the ECB’s Governing Council.Without the access of its banks to the balance sheet of the Eurosystem, either through the normal liquidity facilities or through the ELA, we believe Cyprus would have no choice but to exit from the Eurozone. Even though political pressures no doubt have been, continue to be and will be brought to bear on the Governing Council as regards Cypriot bank access to the facilities of the Eurosystem and the ELA, we find it extraordinary that so much political power rests with unelected technocrats. It is reminiscent of the Emminger letter episode, when in a secret document drawn up in 1978, the German Bundesbank President Otto Emminger was granted power by the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to ignore formal obligations to support weaker countries via (potentially open-ended) foreign exchange intervention during European currency turmoil.

We’ll put the full note in the usual place — it includes a summary of the whole mess, a discussion of the counterfactuals (depression and hyperinflation), whether Cyprus is in fact a template (yes and no — the liability structure of the Cypriot banks was extraordinary), the chances of future bailouts, the state of banking union including the single resolution restructuring and recapitalisation mechanism, the legality of capital controls (basically, yes as the Treaty is a trickster), the idea that a Cyprus euroexit is quite plausible and sundry other things.

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