We wrote earlier about self-reinforcing mechanisms in the economy. We’ve got another one for you, a particularly nasty one..

Markets are supposed to be in equilibrium (supply equals demand), and when they’re not, flexible prices ensure that they will move towards equilibrium. If there is excess supply, the product tends to become cheaper, if there is excess demand, the product tends to become more expensive, both lessen the disequilibrium.

A market based economy is supposed to display these characteristics at large, according to many (but not all) economist. When there is a recession (basically excess supply on a grand scale), things should become cheaper which will entice buyers, when there is a boom, things become more expensive to cool things off.

Unfortunately, the economy at large doesn’t always work this neat, equilibrium restoring way, as we showed in our previous post on this topic:

1. When the economy goes down, credit needs increase, but credit supply decreases, worsening the downturn
2. Banks in trouble need to shore up their balance sheets (basically the reason for 1), but they could be forced to do so by regulators, hence regulation could worsen the business cycle
3. Asset markets typically display self-reinforcing feedback loops, when things are good, people are buying and the beliefs are reinforced

Just a few examples. Now, the nasty one comes from the following (some of the workings we did already explained in that previous post):

The Paradox of Deleveraging

• Once the double bubbles in housing valuation and housing debt burst a little over a year ago, everybody, and in particular, every levered financial institution – banks and shadow banks alike – decided individually that it was time to delever their balance sheets. At the individual level, that made perfect sense.
• At the collective level, however, it has given us the paradox of deleveraging: when we all try to do it at the same time, we actually do less of it, because we collectively create deflation in the assets from which leverage is being removed. Put differently, not all levered lenders can shed assets and the associated debt at the same time without driving down asset prices, which has the paradoxical impact of increasing leverage by driving down lenders’ net worth.
• This process is sometimes called, especially by Fed officials, a negative feedback loop. And it is, though I prefer calling it the paradox of deleveraging, because the very term cries out for both a monetary and fiscal policy response, not just a monetary one. Lower short-term interest rates via Fed easing are, to be sure, useful in mitigating deflating asset prices, particularly if they serve to pull down long-term rates, which are the discount rates for valuing assets with long-dated cash flows.
• But monetary easing is of limited value in breaking the paradox of deleveraging if levered lenders are collectively destroying their collective net worth. What is needed instead is for somebody to lever up and take on the assets being shed by those deleveraging. It really is that simple.
• As Keynes taught us long ago, that somebody is the same somebody that needs to step up spending to break the paradox of thrift: the federal government, which needs to lever up its balance sheet to absorb assets being shed through private sector delevering, so as to avoid pernicious asset deflation. That’s a fiscal policy operation and, fortunately or unfortunately, fiscal policy is not made by a few learned technocrats above the political fray of the democratic process, but is squarely in the hands of the legislative branch, consisting of 535 politicians, with far more lawyers than economists among them.
• Yes, I know that Congress passed a properly Keynesian stimulus package earlier this year, the benefit of which we are feeling now, sending over $100 billion in rebates to the citizenry, borrowing the money to do so and levering up the Treasury’s balance sheet with debt in an equal amount. So, yes, I may be too harsh when I challenge the economic literacy of Congress: they do understand that Uncle Sam should borrow and spend, directly or indirectly through tax rebates to citizen spenders, to truncate the paradox of thrift (even if they don’t know what that is).
• But levering up Uncle Sam’s balance sheet, to buy assets to break asset deflation resulting from the paradox of deleveraging still seems to be a foreign, if not a sinful proposition. This need not be, and should not be. Yet we hear endlessly that any levering up of Uncle Sam’s balance sheet to buy assets must be done in a way that “protects tax payers.” By definition, levering Uncle Sam’s balance sheet to buy or guarantee assets to temper asset deflation will put the taxpayer at risk – but will do so for their own collective good!
• This was de facto what the Federal Reserve did when it put up $29 billion on nonrecourse terms to buy assets so as to facilitate the merger of Bear Stearns into JPMorgan. As I said at the time, and wrote about two months ago1, this was a fiscal policy operation, conducted by the Fed. Logically, it should have been conducted by the Treasury using appropriated spending power from Congress. But alas, that “right” solution was not legally available to the Treasury, whereas the Fed did have the power to act: Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act of 1932 gave the Fed the power to lend to essentially anybody against any collateral, so long as it declares it is necessary to do so because of “unusual and exigent circumstances.”

Krugman doesn’t think the take-over of Freddy and Fanny is enough

• As the economist Irving Fisher observed way back in 1933, when highly indebted individuals and businesses get into financial trouble, they usually sell assets and use the proceeds to pay down their debt. What Fisher pointed out, however, was that such selloffs are self-defeating when everyone does it: if everyone tries to sell assets at the same time, the resulting plunge in market prices undermines debtors’ financial positions faster than debt can be paid off. So deflation in asset prices can turn into a vicious circle. And one consequence of what he called a “stampede to liquidate” is a severe economic slump.
• That’s what’s happening now, with debt deflation made especially ugly by the fact that key financial players are highly leveraged — their assets were mainly bought with borrowed money. As Paul McCulley of Pimco, the bond investor, put it in a recent essay titled “The Paradox of Deleveraging,” lately just about every financial institution has been trying to reduce its leverage — but the plunge in asset values has nonetheless left these institutions with more debt relative to their assets than before.
• And the numbers keep getting worse. In July 2007 Ben Bernanke suggested that subprime losses would be less than $100 billion. Well, last month write-downs by banks and other financial institutions passed the $500 billion mark — and the hits keep coming.
• Which brings us to Fannie and Freddie. They’re the only big financial institutions that haven’t joined in the rush to deleverage, which is why they now account for about 70 percent of new mortgage loans. But their financial foundations have been undermined by debt deflation, even though their lending was more responsible than average. (A subprime borrower is basically someone whose credit wasn’t good enough to qualify for a Fannie- or Freddie-backed mortgage.)
• So Fannie and Freddie had to be rescued — otherwise debt deflation would have gotten much worse. Indeed, their financial troubles have already caused problems for would-be home buyers: mortgage rates are up sharply since earlier this year. With the federal takeover, which removes the pressure on the lenders’ balance sheets, we should see mortgage rates drop again — which is definitely good news.
• But is it enough? I doubt it. The current U.S. financial crisis bears a strong resemblance to the crisis that hit Japan at the end of the 1980s, and led to a decade-long slump that worried many American economists, including both Mr. Bernanke and yours truly. We wondered whether the same thing could take place here — and economists at the Fed devised strategies that were supposed to prevent that from happening. Above all, the response to a Japan-type financial crisis was supposed to involve a very aggressive combination of interest-rate cuts and fiscal stimulus, designed to prevent the crisis from spilling over into a major slump in the real economy.
• When the current crisis hit, Mr. Bernanke was indeed very aggressive about cutting interest rates and pushing funds into the private sector. But despite his cuts, credit became tighter, not easier. And the fiscal stimulus was both too small and poorly targeted, largely because the Bush administration refused to consider any measure that couldn’t be labeled a tax cut.
• As a result, as I suggested, the effort to contain the financial crisis seems to be failing. Asset prices are still falling, losses are still mounting, and the unemployment rate has just hit a five-year high. With each passing month, America is looking more and more Japanese.
• So yes, the Fannie-Freddie rescue was a good thing. But it takes place in the context of a broader economic struggle — a struggle we seem to be losing.